Category: IAEA

The Rhisotope Project team inserting radioactive isotopes into rhino horns. (Martin Klinenboeck/IAEA)

In a pioneering effort to combat wildlife trafficking of the threatened rhinoceros, a South African University today began implementing a project supported by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The project combines the safe insertion of radioactive isotopes into rhino horns and available nuclear security infrastructure to deter and detect illegal poaching.

With over 10,000 rhinos lost to poaching in the past decade, South Africa – home to the world’s largest population of rhinos – remains a target for criminals driven by the illegal trade of rhino horn. In the first quarter of 2025 alone, the South African Ministry of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment reported 103 rhinos poached. In response, this project run by the University of the Witwatersrand is using radiation to support conservation and enforcement efforts.

After two years of initial tests, the Rhisotope Project was created in 2021 with the idea to tag rhino horns with radioactive material. This makes the horns detectable by radiation portal monitors (RPMs) already deployed at borders, ports and airports worldwide. These RPMs, commonly used to detect nuclear and other radioactive material, can now be harnessed against wildlife crime.

The IAEA’s support to the Rhisotope Project leverages its central role in strengthening the global nuclear security framework. With millions of vehicles and people crossing borders every day, the use of an estimated 10,000 RPMs worldwide has become a critical tool for detecting unauthorized transboundary movements of nuclear and other radioactive material.

“The Rhisotope Project shows how nuclear science and nuclear security infrastructure can be used in new ways to address global challenges,” said IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi. “The IAEA is supporting countries to maximize the benefits of nuclear. By using already installed nuclear security infrastructure in novel ways, we can help protect one of the world’s most iconic and endangered species.”

At an event today in the Waterberg, Limpopo, about 250 kilometres north of Johannesburg, the University of Witwatersrand announced the results of the rigorous safety assessments conducted during the pilot phase of the project. In June last year, radioisotopes were inserted into 20 rhinos. Health monitoring and cytological examinations of 15 treated animals and a comparison of five animals not treated were conducted by Ghent University in Belgium. The test results proved that the method is non-invasive and does not pose a risk to the rhinos’ health.

“This has been an international collaboration of likeminded individuals who are trying to make a real difference to this poaching crisis,” said James Larkin, Director, Radiation and Health Physics Unit at the University of the Witwatersrand. “We started with the question – what if radiation could protect rather than harm, by turning rhino horns into traceable markers that stop poachers before they trade? After two years of digital modelling, safety testing and detection simulations, we’re ready to roll out a solution that could truly reduce rhino poaching.”

The success of project also opens the door for future applications to other endangered species.

“The methodology could be adapted to protect other endangered species like elephants or pangolins,” said Larkin.

The IAEA is providing both technical and financial support to the project under its Coordinated Research Project titled Facilitation of Safe and Secure Trade Using Nuclear Detection Technology – Detection of RN and Other Contraband. As part of the project, the Agency also supports countries in their efforts to optimize the detection of radiation by the use of its Minimum Detectable Quantity and Alarm Threshold Estimation Tool, thereby allowing detection of the tagged with radiation rhino horns.

“The Rhisotope Project brings the entire global nuclear security network into play,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA Division of Nuclear Security. “The nuclear security infrastructure that exists in many countries around the world to detect smuggling of nuclear and other radioactive material can be used to pick up the trafficking of rhino horn, and any other contraband that might be carried alongside it. Committing to nuclear security pays off in multiple ways.”

B-roll and photos will be made available here.

Members of the INSServ team visited the Kenneth Kaunda International Airport during the IAEA mission to Zambia. (Photo: Radiation Protection Authority, Zambia)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) completed an advisory service mission to Zambia focused on assessing the country’s nuclear security regime for nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control, referred to as MORC. The team recognized Zambia’s commitment to nuclear security through its efforts to prevent, detect and respond to unauthorized acts involving MORC, and pointed out capacity building and coordination among stakeholders as areas for further enhancement.

The International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) mission was conducted at the request of the Republic of Zambia and took place from 14 to 23 July 2025. Hosted by the Radiation Protection Authority (RPA) of Zambia, the mission was led by Samer Quran, Director of the National Centre for Nuclear and Radiological Security at the Energy and Minerals Regulatory Commission in Jordan.

The team comprised of five experts from Argentina, Egypt, Jordan, Norway and the USA, as well as two IAEA staff members.

INSServ missions aim to support States in strengthening their ability to prevent, detect and respond to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear or other MORC, which is lost, missing, stolen, improperly disposed of, or inadequately stored or handled. The scope of the INSServ mission included the foundational elements of nuclear security systems and measures for MORC, as well as detection and response systems and measures.

“Following an International Physical Protection Advisory Service in 2023, the first INSServ mission in Zambia builds on the country’s ongoing efforts to improve its nuclear security regime by leveraging the available IAEA assistance mechanisms,” said Elena Buglova, Director of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. “We are looking forward to continued cooperation with Zambia’s competent authorities for strengthening nuclear security.”

During the mission to Zambia, the team conducted a series of meetings with officials from the RPA, the Office of the President, the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Technology and Science, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Zambia Police Service, National Anti-Terrorism Center, Immigration Department, Zambia Airports Cooperation, Civil Aviation Authority and Zambia Revenue Authority.

The team also conducted site visits to Kenneth Kaunda International Airport, the Kazungula (land) Border, the RPA Inland Office in Livingstone, the Kapiri-Mposhi Railway Station and the National Institute for Scientific and Industrial Research.

“The country has made progress in developing and implementing nuclear security measures at its borders and within its territory. The mission confirmed Zambia’s commitment to further improvements concluding that the country should continue to build on its efforts to strengthen multi-agency cooperation and coordination among national competent authorities responsible for nuclear security,” said Samer Quran, the INSServ Team Leader.

To further enhance its nuclear security capabilities, the team recommended that Zambia develop comprehensive training programmes for its personnel, including exercises. The experts identified good practices in the field of information security and in processes aimed at reducing the risk of insider threats.

“The INSServ mission marks a significant milestone in Zambia’s commitment to strengthening nuclear security. The recommendations received will guide our efforts to build a robust and resilient nuclear security regime, protecting our people from the risks posed by nuclear and radioactive material outside regulatory control,” said Boster D. Siwila, Executive Director of the RPA.

The IAEA’s INSServ mission is part of its ongoing efforts to assist Member States in strengthening their nuclear security regimes in relation to MORC. The Agency provides a range of services in this area, including expert advice, training and equipment support, to help Member States protect against criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving such materials.

The draft findings and recommendations were presented to the Republic of Zambia, and the final report will be presented in about three months.

Background

The mission was the 89th INSServ mission conducted by the IAEA, since the programme began in 2006.

INSServ missions, based on the INSServ guidelines published in 2019, assist States in establishing, maintaining and strengthening their nuclear security regime related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The missions provide independent advice on implementing international instruments, along with IAEA guidance on the prevention and detection of and response to criminal and intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. 

Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi meets President Tharman Shanmugaratnam in Singapore.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi visited Singapore last week to reaffirm support to the country and the wider region, as interest grows in Southeast Asia for nuclear power and technology.  

During his trip, Mr Grossi met with President Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, and Minister-in-charge of Energy and Science and Technology Tan See Leng. Their conversations focused on the region’s growing interest in nuclear energy, peaceful applications of nuclear technology such as in health and food security, and the importance of effective multilateralism. 

Singapore is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), many of whose members are considering nuclear power. 

“This visit confirmed what we are seeing worldwide: momentum is building, and ASEAN’s interest in nuclear energy is real and promising,” said Mr Grossi. “This stable and low-carbon option clearly has a role to play in the region’s energy future.” 

This topic was also covered during his meeting with Singapore’s president, which Mr Grossi called “an honour” and said: “Our exchange touched on shared priorities for a safer, more sustainable future.”  

This collaborative approach was also reflected in his meeting with the prime minister.

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi

(As prepared for delivery)

I thank the President of the Security Council for allowing me the opportunity to update you on the IAEA’s activities concerning nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. I also thank the Council for their continuing support of the IAEA’s efforts.

It has been more than two years since the war began, the first ever to be fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.

The IAEA has been monitoring the situation closely and assisting Ukraine every day since the start of the war. IAEA staff are continuously present, monitoring the situation at all five of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, which remains under Russian operational control.

Today my statement will focus on the recent grave violations of the five concrete principles that I first established in this very chamber on 30 May. These five concrete principles are there to prevent a nuclear accident and to maintain the integrity of the Zaporizhzhya NPP.  Let me remind them what they are:  

1. There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel;
2. ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant;
3. Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure off-site power remains available and secure at all times;
4. All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage;
5. No action should be taken that undermines these principles.

On 30 May last year I said here that observing these principles was essential to avoid the danger of a catastrophic nuclear incident and that I had respectfully and solemnly asked both sides to commit to them.

At our meeting last May distinguished Members of the Security Council and Ukraine clearly supported those principles.

Nevertheless, Madame President, over the past ten days, the first of these principles has been violated repeatedly in what marks a step-change increase in risk to nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

On Sunday, 7 April, the International Support and Assistance Mission to ZNPP (ISAMZ) confirmed the first attacks since November 2022 to directly target ZNPP.

The ISAMZ team was able to inspect the location of one direct strike at the apex of the containment dome of the Unit 6 reactor building.  Whilst the damage to the structure is superficial, the attack sets a very dangerous precedent of the successful targeting of the reactor containment. 

The other two attacks were in close proximity to the main reactor buildings and resulted in at least one casualty.

Agency experts at the site have been informed by ZNPP of a drone strike against the site’s oxygen and nitrogen production facility; two attacks on the training centre located just outside the site perimeter and reports of a drone shot down above the turbine hall of Unit 6. 

These reckless attacks must cease immediately. Though, fortunately,  they have not led to a radiological incident this time, they significantly increase the risk at Zaporizhzhya NPP, where nuclear safety is already compromised.

I am not only concerned about the attacks themselves, but also the context in which they have occurred. For several months before these direct attacks there had already been an increase in isolated drone incursions in the vicinity of the facility and in the nearby town of Energodar.

In other areas of nuclear safety degradation, the plant is currently relying on just two lines of external power. There have been at least four occasions in the past year when the plant has had only one line of external power supply, with the precarity lasting for periods of up to four months.

Let me put it plainly. Two years of war are weighing heavily on nuclear safety at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Every one of the IAEA’s 7 pillars of nuclear safety and security have been compromised.  We cannot sit by and watch as the final weight tips the finely balanced scale.   

Even though the plant’s six reactors are now in cold shutdown, with the final unit shifting into that status two days ago following the IAEA’s recommendation, the potential dangers of a major nuclear accident remain very real.

The Agency will continue closely to follow the operational status of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and provide technically viable alternatives in a context of rapid changes and challenges.

Our work at this facility remains essential. This has been recognized by all, irrespective of their side in this conflict. But to be effective, the IAEA teams need timely access to assess the condition of the plant and evaluate the cumulative impact that more than 26 months in a war zone have had on nuclear safety.

Madame President,

We are getting dangerously close to a nuclear accident. We must not allow complacency to let a roll of the dice decide what happens tomorrow. We must do everything in our power today to minimize the risk of an accident.

The five principles established in this very chamber one year ago must be adhered to. They are there to prevent a major nuclear accident with potentially significant radiological consequences.

The latest attacks represent a flagrant violation of these crucial principles and must stop.

I am asking this Council for its steadfast support for the five principles and the IAEA’s seven pillars of nuclear safety and security which they help to underpin. And I am asking for your continued support of the IAEA’s role monitoring the situation, in the service of the international community.  

Despite huge challenges, the IAEA has kept open the indispensable lines of communication and will continue doing so. The support of your nations and of the Council as a whole is a necessity.

I thank the Council for inviting me today, thereby demonstrating your continuing commitment to this critical issue.

The IAEA and myself remain at your disposal to assist this body in its mission to preserve international peace and security.

Thank you, Madame President.

As of 2025, the IAEA has trained close to 2,500 professionals from 137 countries through the PGEC. (Photo: L. Grindrod/IAEA)

Dozens of participants have completed the latest IAEA post-graduate courses in radiation protection, enabling them to help safely expand the use of nuclear science and technology in 31 participating countries.

The latest participants completed intensive, six-month Postgraduate Educational Courses in Radiation Protection and the Safety of Radiation Sources (PGEC) in either Greece or Ghana, designed to prepare them for work as radiation protection experts, regulators and nuclear safety professionals.

“For close to 45 years, PGEC has continuously trained new generations of experts in Europe and Central Asia for work in the field of radiation protection,” explained Emina Alic, IAEA Programme Management Officer. “Today, former PGEC graduates are helping to shape the future of their country’s engagement with nuclear applications as national operators, regulators and policymakers.”

“With the increased use of radiation sources in Africa, radiation safety has become one of the main priority areas of the IAEA’s regional technical cooperation programme for Africa,” explained IAEA Programme Management Officer Felix Omonya. “The IAEA has provided substantial support in the form of equipment and expert guidance, but in terms of training, the PGEC represents a cornerstone of our capacity building efforts.”

Radioactive sources are manufactured in research reactors. As they decay through their lifetime, the radiation they emit can be used to diagnose or treat cancers, measure pollution or monitor industrial processes. When they reach the end of their life, the radioactive sources are interred safely in waste storage or disposal facilities. X ray machines on the other hand, generate radiation on demand, offering a predictable and reliable source of radiation that can be made safe as soon as its work is done.  

The use of these radiation sources and technologies requires a comprehensive framework of national legislation and regulations and relies on the availability of sufficiently trained and motivated safety professionals. The IAEA’s PGEC responds to this need by helping to develop a cohort of radiation protection professionals through a combination of theoretical, classroom instruction and hands-on training.

“While some regulatory frameworks are in place in my country, there is still a pressing need to update existing regulations in line with international standards,” explained Blinda Mutuzo of the Rwanda Atomic Energy Board. “The PGEC covered many of the areas where we most need support and offered practical knowledge on regulatory frameworks, authorization and inspection processes, source management and more.”

“The course helped me grow professionally by expanding my knowledge and confidence in radiation protection. It also allowed me to connect with experts and peers from other countries. These connections may lead to future collaborations in training, technical assistance or policy development,” said Mutuzo.

“Emergency preparedness and the improvement of the established early warning system are among Lithuania’s priorities at the moment,” said Kornelija Dacytė, Chief Specialist of Lithuania’s Radiation Protection Centre. “Not only did PGEC respond to these national needs, I am now hoping to adjust my career trajectory to focus more on emergency preparedness and I hope to support decision-making through atmospheric dispersion modelling.” The IAEA supports countries to use atmospheric dispersion modelling to simulate the spread of air pollutants, including radioactive substances.