Category: IAEA

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

When the IAEA Board of Governors appointed Ambassador Yukiya Amano as the fifth Director General of the Agency in 2009, he was already a skilful and widely respected diplomat, with many years of experience in disarmament and non-proliferation.

At that time and as a candidate for the position of Director General, Mr Amano had promised to provide strong and effective management, to insist that all safeguards agreements between the Agency and its Member States should be implemented fully, and to strengthen the delivery of technical cooperation.

In nearly 10 years in office, he delivered substantial and concrete achievements in all of these areas.

Right from the start, Director General Amano showed strong leadership and demonstrated total commitment to fulfilling the objectives of the IAEA.

As Chair of the Board of Governors, I greatly valued his wisdom and advice. He respected the prerogatives of Member States, but firmly defended  the independence of Agency staff in fulfilling their mandate.

Having been Chair of the Board himself in 2005, he fully understood the challenges of the position and was generous in sharing his experience. His deep understanding of technical matters and political sensitivities was of great value to me in the fulfilment of my duties.

At the special Board meeting last month, Member States were united in paying tribute to his great diplomatic skill, his professionalism, his determination to deliver the best possible service to Member States – and his personal warmth and charm.

Mr Amano worked tirelessly to enhance the services offered by the Agency in all areas of its work.

In safeguards, the number of countries with additional protocols in force grew from 94 to 134 during his term of office.

Director General Amano made a vital contribution during the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of  Action.

He firmly believed that the benefits of nuclear power should not  be limited to developed countries. He worked hard to ensure that peaceful nuclear science and technology were made available for the benefit of developing countries in human and animal health, food and agriculture, industry, water management and many other   areas.

He had a strong personal commitment to improving cancer control in developing countries, which helped to save lives. Until shortly before his death, Mr Amano was working with his staff on the upcoming Scientific Forum, which will focus on the IAEA’s contribution to cancer control during the last 10 years.

The new laboratories at Seibersdorf, which he energetically promoted,  will form a major part of his legacy.

Director General Amano changed the motto of the Agency to Atoms for Peace and Development to better reflect the contribution of the IAEA in assisting countries in the peaceful use of nuclear technology for their development. This motto will always remind us of him.

He was keen to see the Agency’s activities on the ground for himself and to fully understand the needs of Member States. He visited as many as 20 or 30 countries every year. My own country, Jordan, was one of many which he visited more than once. My authorities greatly appreciated his personal interest in helping Jordan to make more use of nuclear science and technology for the benefit of our people.

Director General Amano attached great importance to the Agency’s role in assisting Member States in improving nuclear safety and security.

After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, he led the international effort to provide assistance to Japan and actively encouraged Member States to learn the essential lessons from the accident. Mr Amano was an active proponent of the strengthening of nuclear safety standards throughout the world.

In nuclear security, his efforts contributed greatly to the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. During his term of office, the International Conference on Nuclear Security became recognized as the leading forum for Ministers and other high- level representatives of IAEA Member States to consider this topic.

Member States appreciated Mr Amano’s skilful handling of the IAEA budget and his understanding of the financial constraints many of them faced. He worked hard to ensure that more women were appointed to senior positions in the Agency and made visible progress on improving gender balance.

Mrs Amano, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today, we mourn with profound sadness the untimely loss of a superb international civil servant and a kind and decent man.

I express my deepest sympathy to you, Mrs Amano. I sincerely hope you will have a chance to read or view the statements made by Member States in tribute to your husband in the Board last month. We heard over 90 beautifully written statements that show not just an appreciation for his admirable professionalism, but a genuine affection for him personally – including his lack of pomposity, the twinkle in his eye, and his cheeky sense of humour.

I also offer my condolences to Mr Amano’s extended family and to IAEA staff.

His remarkable legacy will continue to inspire IAEA Member States and Agency staff as we all work together to implement our Atoms for Peace and Development mandate in the years to  come.

Director General Yukiya Amano had a great impact in the world. We are grateful for his commitment and dedication to improving the well-being of humankind. Mr Amano was an outstanding professional and an exceptional human being. We miss him.

May his soul rest in peace. Thank you.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

(As prepared for delivery)

Good morning, Mr/Madam (Deputy) Minister, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am very pleased to attend this meeting of the Regional Cooperation Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean.

I congratulate ARCAL on its 35th anniversary and I thank the Technical Cooperation Board, OCTA, for inviting me today.

Since becoming IAEA Director General in 2009, I have visited many of our Member States in Latin America and the Caribbean.

It has been fascinating to observe the steady progress being made by countries of this region in using nuclear science and technology to improve the health and prosperity of their people.

ARCAL played a key role in this process. Its work has also led to a significant strengthening of what is often called “South-south cooperation,” with more advanced users of nuclear technology sharing their expertise with their neighbours.

South-South cooperation has strengthened the impact of the work of the IAEA in transferring nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It helps to ensure that technology transfer is closely aligned to the needs and priorities of beneficiary countries and encourages the efficient use of limited resources.

Collaboration with other UN organizations such as the Pan-American Health Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization has been very helpful in increasing the impact of IAEA and ARCAL projects.

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework, UNDAF, is also an important mechanism. I commend Cuba for its current efforts to formulate a new UNDAF and encourage all national ARCAL Coordinators to actively participate in the formulation and implementation of the UNDAFs in their respective countries.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

ARCAL and the IAEA have worked together effectively for the past 35 years to make nuclear science and technology available in health care, food and agriculture, industry and many other areas.

The Agency cooperates directly with each of your 21 state parties. But ARCAL has proven to be an excellent framework for taking a more strategic approach to using nuclear technology to help address common problems across this region of some 580 million people.

ARCAL and the IAEA are presently working together on the basis of the Regional Strategic Profile for Latin America and the Caribbean for 2016 to 2021. It identified six priority areas: food security, human health, the environment, energy, radiation safety and radiation technologies.

A total of 163 IAEA technical cooperation projects were approved for ARCAL countries over the past 35 years.

Key achievements include curbing fruit fly infestation in countries such as Mexico and Guatemala, using the sterile insect technique.

The use of radiation-induced mutation techniques led to the development of new varieties of foods such as tomato and quinoa in a number of countries. Here in Cuba, a robust variety of rice introduced in 1997 continues to enjoy great success.

Together, ARCAL and the IAEA have helped countries in the region to improve management of precious water resources and monitor marine pollution.

I am proud of the IAEA’s ability to respond quickly to emergencies in Member States.

In 2016, for example, we provided nuclear-derived early detection tools and training support to help rapidly identify cases of the Zika virus after outbreaks were reported in 26 countries and territories in this region.

After the deadly earthquake in Ecuador in April 2016, we dispatched four mobile digital X-ray units, as well as mobile generators, emergency diagnostic equipment and personal radiation detectors.

Last year, the IAEA provided equipment to both Ecuador and Mexico so they could use non-destructive testing techniques, including radiography, to determine whether buildings and other structures damaged in earthquakes were in danger of collapse.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Since 2015, helping countries to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, using relevant nuclear technology, has been an important part of our work.

In fact, the IAEA helps countries to use nuclear science and technology to meet at least nine of the 17 SDGs directly, including those aimed at ending hunger, improving human health, increasing the availability of clean water, and, of course, energy.

The IAEA is unique within the UN system in having eight nuclear applications laboratories near Vienna. These train scientists, support research in human health, food and other areas, and provide analytical services to national laboratories.

A long-overdue modernisation of the laboratories is nearing completion, thanks to generous contributions from IAEA Member States.

When the modernisation is finished, we will be able to deliver improved services to Member States to make food safer, improve control of harmful insect pests, and maximize the benefits of new radiation technology for cancer treatment – to name just a few examples.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me single out one of those examples and say a few words about cancer control.

Cancer is the second most important cause of death in Latin America and the Caribbean, after cardiovascular diseases.

Nuclear medicine and radiotherapy have made considerable progress in this region and the IAEA is proud to have contributed. But more needs to be done to enlarge the geographical reach of advanced technologies, which are not evenly spread throughout the region.

ARCAL Member States have identified the development of regionally produced radiopharmaceuticals, used in cancer diagnosis and treatment, and training for radiotherapy technicians and medical physicists as priorities for technical cooperation with the IAEA.

The current five-year Regional Strategic Profile includes a focus on strengthening national cancer control programmes.

As part of our contribution, IAEA expert missions assess the level of nuclear medicine and radiotherapy services in a country and offer recommendations on improvements.

Working closely with ARCAL, the IAEA helps countries to plan and build nuclear medicine and radiotherapy facilities. We arrange education and training for oncologists, radiologists, medical physicists and other specialists.

In 2017, we launched a one-year Masters programme in advanced radiotherapy for medical students from ARCAL countries in Santiago, Chile, co-hosted by the Arturo López Pérez Foundation and the University of Los Andes. It is the first course of its kind in this region.

A new linear accelerator facility has just been installed at our Dosimetry Laboratory, near Vienna. It will soon become operational, significantly expanding the services we offer to Member States in improving cancer treatment.

The Dosimetry Lab has already contributed to improved treatment quality and patient safety throughout the world by helping to ensure that patients receive exactly the right dose of radiation.

The Agency has a long history of supporting countries in developing the capacity and infrastructure needed for the safe and secure use of radiation in diagnosing and treating cancer.

After some shortcomings were identified with our Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy, PACT – which is one of the key divisions that conduct our cancer control activities – we made important changes to our general approach in this area.

This includes streamlining the work of PACT and adopting a unified, one-house approach to cancer control, led by my Office. This will enable us to be more effective in delivering concrete assistance to Member States.

In September this year, the IAEA Scientific Forum will focus on cancer control. It will review countries’ achievements over the last 10 years and consider how the Agency can best meet their needs in the future.

I encourage all ARCAL countries to participate.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In conclusion, let me congratulate Cuba on taking on the presidency of ARCAL and compliment Mexico on its successful leadership of this important organization for the past two years.

I wish you every success with your meeting.

The IAEA will continue to strengthen our partnership with ARCAL in the coming decades for the benefit of all the people of this region.

Thank you.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

(As prepared for delivery)

Good afternoon, Ladies and Gentlemen.

I am very pleased to be with you today.

I have long been impressed by the considerable intellectual firepower which CSIS brings to bear on the major issues in international relations.

I have been involved in nuclear verification for the past 25 years, both as a diplomat and as Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Today, I will share with you my observations on some of the challenges that we face and our efforts to address them. I will also consider some topical issues that may be of interest to this knowledgeable audience.  

Ladies and Gentlemen,

For more than 60 years, the IAEA has made a unique contribution to international peace and security by verifying that countries are not developing nuclear weapons.

Today, we implement safeguards in 182 countries. Thanks to the dedication and professionalism of our staff, our work in nuclear verification – and indeed in all areas – enjoys great credibility. We are trusted by our 171 Member States. I am very grateful for their support.

As head of this remarkable organization, I am fortunate to have the services of a highly skilled team of several hundred safeguards inspectors and expert analytical staff. Supported by state-of-the-art technology, they help us to draw safeguards conclusions which we report to our Board of Governors in our annual Safeguards Implementation Report.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

One of the most important developments in the history of nuclear verification was the approval by our Board in 1997 of a new legal instrument – the additional protocol to the safeguards agreements which countries conclude with the IAEA.

Generally known as the AP, this is a powerful verification tool. It gives the Agency broader access to information about all parts of a State’s nuclear fuel cycle, including research and development activities, as well as the manufacturing and export of sensitive nuclear-related equipment and material. The AP also gives our inspectors greater access to locations, in some cases with as little as two hours’ notice.

The additional protocol significantly increases the Agency’s ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a country. Without it, we cannot draw what we call the “broader conclusion” that all nuclear material in a country has remained in peaceful activities.

When I became IAEA Director General in 2009, only 94 countries were implementing the AP. The Agency actively encouraged countries to implement APs and provided practical assistance, for example in drafting or amending legislation. Today, 134 countries have brought APs into force. This is very encouraging. However, the combination of comprehensive safeguards agreement and AP needs to become universal. I constantly encourage all countries that have not yet done so to conclude and implement additional protocols.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Despite positive developments such as the introduction of the additional protocol, we face some challenges in our nuclear verification work.

The world in which the IAEA implements safeguards today is very different from that envisaged by our founding fathers in 1957. Nuclear proliferation is now easier than it has ever been. Globalization, new technology and modern communications have made it possible to access knowledge, materials and expertise that were previously not widely available.

Many countries, both developed and developing, have made great technological progress. Technology that could be used for the development of nuclear weapons is no longer out of reach.

The steady increase in the amount of nuclear material and the number of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, and continuing pressure on our regular budget, are among the key challenges facing the Agency today.

The amount of nuclear material in the world is growing every year as countries make more use of nuclear power and other peaceful applications of nuclear technology. Nuclear material no longer in use, and nuclear facilities that have been shut down, also remain under safeguards.

I am grateful for the financial support of our Member States in what for many are difficult circumstances. But the fact is that, for some years, the IAEA has had to undertake verification activities against a background of close to zero budget increases. This year, our budget has actually been cut.

Pressure on the regular budget is a particularly serious problem for the IAEA. Why? Because, under our Statute, inspections must be financed through the regular budget. This is intended to ensure that safeguards implementation is neutral and unbiased. Voluntary contributions from Member States therefore cannot be used for inspections, which are at the heart of safeguards implementation. If our regular budget continues to suffer cuts in the coming years, a reduction in the number of IAEA inspectors will be unavoidable. This could seriously undermine our nuclear verification activities.

Let me give you a few numbers. Our safeguards budget last year was around 142 million euros. Since 2010, it has increased by only 6.3 percent in real terms.

However, in the same period, the number of nuclear facilities under safeguards rose by 12 percent to just over 1,300, while the number of so-called significant quantities of nuclear material under safeguards – that means enough material to make a nuclear explosive device – grew by 24% to 213,000. The number of nuclear material accounting reports from Member States which we process has gone up by more than a third since 2010 to 880,000.

All of this means that an ever-increasing burden is being placed on our nuclear safeguards inspectors and analytical staff. We have responded by doing our best to work as efficiently as possible and find more cost-effective ways of doing things. For example, we have increased the number of surveillance cameras installed at facilities where nuclear material is present by a third since 2010 to nearly 1,600. The number of unattended monitoring systems has risen by 16 percent to 171, while the number of remotely readable, tamper-proof seals placed on nuclear material has jumped by nearly 280 percent to 560. Partly as a result of these efforts, the number of days spent by our inspectors in the field has barely changed since 2010, increasing by just 0.4%. We will continue to seek efficiency measures, but we are approaching the limits of what is possible given the need to maintain a sufficient number of inspectors in the field.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

A clear division of responsibility between the IAEA and Member States has traditionally been respected. We are responsible for the technical work of implementing safeguards. Member States make any policy decisions they may consider necessary, based on the factual and impartial reports which we provide.

The credibility of the Agency is our greatest asset. Impartial, independent and objective safeguards implementation is essential to maintain that credibility. If our credibility is thrown into question, and, in particular, if attempts are made to micro-manage or put pressure on the Agency in implementing nuclear verification, that would be counter-productive and extremely harmful.

I periodically remind IAEA Member States of the importance of respecting established safeguards practices. The bottom line is that Member States should not intervene in our work of safeguards implementation. We, for our part, do not attempt to intervene in policy decisions of the Board and General Conference.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Periodic attempts have been made to give the Agency new tools in nuclear verification.

In 2005/2006, a Member State grouping known as Committee 25 considered ways of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. It considered topics such as enhancing the Agency’s satellite imagery capabilities and encouraging States to provide additional information on specified equipment and non-nuclear material to enable the Agency to better address clandestine nuclear trade. However, after six meetings and numerous reports and presentations, those discussions ended without agreement. 

For the foreseeable future, I see little prospect of Member States deciding to expand the existing verification instruments at the Agency’s disposal – comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. We will therefore continue to work with the existing tools.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me give you some examples of how we have responded to the challenges I have outlined.

As I mentioned, the additional protocol is the most robust and powerful tool at our disposal. Efforts to make it universal must continue and the cooperation of Member States is crucial.

Investing in the most up-to-date technology has helped us to improve the effectiveness of nuclear verification.

A major step forward was the completion in 2015 of a comprehensive modernization of the IAEA safeguards laboratories, costing around 80 million euros. I am proud to tell you that we finished this major project on time and within budget.

The modernized laboratories increased our capacity for sampling nuclear material by over 50 percent and gave us improved precision in analytical services. Without this new technology, the Agency could not have undertaken the work of verifying and monitoring Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as speedily and efficiently as we have.

A piece of equipment known as a large geometry secondary ion mass spectrometer is so sensitive that it can identify a single uranium or plutonium particle 100 times smaller than the width of a strand of human hair. The tests we carry out to determine whether uranium is present in a sample of material are 10 times more sensitive than they were before the new laboratories became operational. The time required to analyse nuclear material and swipe samples for the possible presence of plutonium has been reduced from 55 days to 35.

We have benefited from advances in satellite imagery. We increasingly monitor nuclear facilities remotely in real time, using permanently installed cameras and other instruments. The Agency collects and analyses hundreds of thousands of images captured daily by our surveillance cameras installed in numerous nuclear facilities.

Under a project known as MOSAIC, completed in 2018, we undertook an extensive overhaul of our safeguards IT system. The result has been an enhancement of existing IT tools and software applications, and the introduction of new ones. We now have an IT system that enables us to conduct safeguards activities more effectively and efficiently.

 Our Collaborative Analysis Platform, the first phase of which was completed in March 2017, allows us to use some of the most powerful search engines and analytical tools available anywhere in the world. This has led to a dramatic surge in the number of open-source items of information collected by the Agency to the point where we now collect over 140 million such items every year. The Platform enables staff to spot possible relationships and patterns among different items of information relevant to safeguards.

Technological developments are exciting and proceeding at a rapid rate. But I must stress that technology can never be a full substitute for the presence of experienced inspectors on the ground. That will always be essential for effective nuclear verification.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

An important development in the IAEA’s verification work has been the introduction of what we call the State-level safeguards approach. This involves implementing safeguards in countries by considering their nuclear activities and related technical capabilities as a whole, rather than on a facility basis.

This has been the subject of extensive dialogue with Member States. So far, we have developed State-level safeguards approaches for 130 countries with comprehensive safeguards agreements. Around 97% of all nuclear material in States with CSAs is located in these countries. This approach has enabled the Agency to better focus its verification efforts and led to better use of resources. We will continue to cooperate with countries to develop and implement State-level safeguards approaches as we accumulate experience with implementing them.

Another notable development has been the establishment of highly specialised, expert teams which focus exclusively on some of the most important safeguards issues. In recent years, I have created such teams in the case of Iran and North Korea. This focus enables team members to build up unrivalled, in-depth knowledge and experience of the nuclear programmes of the State on which they are concentrating.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

You are all familiar with the high-profile verification cases on the Agency’s agenda – Iran, North Korea and Syria.

There is a limit to what we can say publicly about these and other cases because we are legally obliged to protect confidential information entrusted to us. In particular, the Agency does not publicly discuss information provided by third parties.  This can sometimes make it difficult for Member States and the public to understand what the Agency is doing. It can also be frustrating for us when we see inaccurate information under discussion in the public domain. However, public silence on our part on a particular issue should never be taken to mean inaction. We work quietly and methodically, within the established safeguards framework. If we have concerns about the nuclear activities of a particular country that cannot be resolved with that country, we bring our concerns to the attention of our Board of Governors.

The Iran nuclear issue has a long and complex history. The IAEA has focused on Iran’s nuclear activities since 2002. In December 2015, I presented a Final Assessment on past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme to the IAEA Board.

I stated that Iran had conducted a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device before the end of 2003. However, these activities did not advance beyond feasibility and scientific studies, and the acquisition of certain relevant technical competences and capabilities. I also stated that the Agency had no credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.

The Board declared that its consideration of this item was closed. This paved the way for implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to begin in January 2016.

Since then, the IAEA has been verifying and monitoring Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. In my regular reports to the Board, I have stated that Iran is implementing those commitments. The Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of nuclear material declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran continue.

The arrangements in place for Iran, comprising a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, Additional Protocol, and additional transparency measures under the JCPOA, amount to the most robust verification system in existence anywhere in the world.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is 10 years this month since IAEA inspectors were required to leave North Korea. Since then, the Agency has not been able to carry out any verification activities in the country. However, the Agency continues to monitor the DPRK’s nuclear programme and evaluate all safeguards-relevant information available to it, including open source information and satellite imagery.

In the past 10 years, the DPRK’s nuclear programme has significantly expanded. The country announced in 2009 that it would start uranium enrichment and build a light water reactor. In 2013, it announced that it would take measures to readjust and restart all the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. The DPRK has done what it said it would do.

The Agency has observed indications of various activities at the Yongbyon site. These include the operation of the 5MW(e) reactor and reprocessing plant, the extension of the building housing the reported centrifuge enrichment facility, the continuing construction of the light water reactor, as well as diverse infrastructure work. Since 2009, the DPRK has announced on five separate occasions that it had conducted a nuclear test, in addition to the one announced in 2006.

Over the past year, activities at some facilities continued or developed further, while some other facilities appeared not to be operating. In Yongbyon, we have seen indications of the continued use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility throughout the past year. Construction of the Light Water Reactor continued, and some infrastructure work took place near the Kuryong River. We saw indications that the 5 MW(e) reactor was in operation until late summer, but then operations became intermittent and it seems not to have been operating since December. There have been no indications of reprocessing activities at the Radiochemical Laboratory.

However, without access, the Agency cannot confirm the nature and purpose of the activities that I described.

The IAEA closely follows international developments on the DPRK nuclear issue. We hope that these processes will lead to an agreement and to the implementation of concrete denuclearization measures. The Agency does not have a role in political negotiations among countries concerned. However, it is important that any agreement on denuclearization is accompanied by an effective and sustainable verification mechanism.

The IAEA, with its long experience and well-established practices, is the only international organization that can conduct verification and monitoring activities in an impartial, independent and objective manner. This would help to make the implementation of any agreement sustainable. It would also contribute to the denuclearization of the DPRK in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as required by numerous resolutions of the Security Council.

Since 2017, the Agency has intensified its efforts to monitor the DPRK’s nuclear programme and enhanced its readiness to undertake verification and monitoring activities in the DPRK if a political agreement is reached among countries concerned. Subject to the approval of our Board of Governors, we could respond within weeks to any request to send inspectors back to the DPRK.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In June 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors found Syria to be in non-compliance with its obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.

This followed my report the previous month which concluded that it was very likely that a building at the Dair Alzour site, which was destroyed by Israel in 2007, was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency by Syria under its Safeguards Agreement. Syria has not engaged substantively with the Agency on the nature of the Dair Alzour site and three other locations since June 2008.

Such cases serve as a reminder of the extent to which safeguards implementation depends on cooperation by the countries concerned. They also illustrate the need for States to engage in serious negotiations in cases of non-compliance in order to make it possible for the Agency to carry out its verification work.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

On a more general note, allow me to say a few words about the IAEA’s use of what is known as third-party information. This refers to information made available to the Agency by a State, other party or individuals, relating to another State. It may include nuclear procurement related information, or information that might suggest the possible existence of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State which should be subject to safeguards.

Third-party information is a very small part of the information available to the Agency, but it can play an important role in identifying issues that we may need to address. We know from experience that, sometimes, information provided to the Agency can be simply wrong. At times, we find it to be accurate and credible. The use of third-party information has enabled the Agency to take follow-up actions with several countries to address issues related to the correctness and completeness of their declarations.

In line with established safeguards practices, all safeguards-relevant information, including third party information, is reviewed very critically, carefully evaluated, and followed up with the State concerned, if necessary. We do not take any information at face value. No single piece of information is used without having been thoroughly analysed. If we assess that the information is broadly credible, we take action such as requesting clarification from the State, or seeking access to information or locations. If information is not credible, we do not take action.

Experience has shown this to be the right approach.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

A question that has arisen periodically in recent decades concerns weaponization issues.

For me, it is clear that the Agency has the authority to look into weaponization because our mandate is to prevent the diversion and misuse of nuclear material.

If the Agency becomes aware of possible weaponization activities in a country, and these activities could be related to nuclear material or the nuclear fuel cycle, then the Agency seeks clarification from the State under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and/or additional protocol of the country concerned. Our authority in such cases is clear.

In the past, the Agency has also addressed possible weaponization activities involving dual–use technology, with the involvement of Member States or with the mandate from our Board of Governors or the Security Council.

In all cases, the Agency acts impartially, independently and objectively. The Director General is, as always, subject to the authority of the Board of Governors.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Despite the challenges I have outlined, the IAEA remains a highly effective organization which is fully implementing its Atoms for Peace and Development mandate. I remain optimistic about its future.

Member State support is strong and our membership continues to grow. Staff morale is high. However, the IAEA safeguards system, which the world has grown used to as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, should not be taken for granted.

I am doing all I can to use the resources entrusted to us by Member States as efficiently and effectively as possible. But efficiency gains can only achieve so much and, as I said a moment ago, we are gradually approaching the limits of what is possible. It is important that secure funding is available for the IAEA’s nuclear verification activities.

Impartial, independent and objective nuclear verification is the foundation of my approach. It is at the heart of the credibility which the IAEA enjoys. As Director General, I make every effort to ensure that our credibility is maintained. But that is a shared responsibility. Member States need to play their part.

I am confident that Member States will provide the active practical and moral support that will enable the IAEA to continue to make a unique and valuable contribution to international security through nuclear verification.

Thank you.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

(As prepared for delivery)

Thank you very much for inviting me to this event. I am very happy to see lots of people, both from the Member States and from our staff. Perhaps today we have more women and I am very very happy to see them. The IAEA has been celebrating International Women’s Day for years and I have been attending these events every year. The activities and celebrations are becoming more and more active, year by year, and I would like to congratulate you for that.

The representation of women in the IAEA has not been that high. As far as I know, there have been no women candidates for my post. There has been no female Director General in the IAEA. When I became the Director General of this Agency in 2009, the representation of women was around 22 percent – between 1/4 and 1/5 [of staff at P level and above]. So, I took that issue up and tried to increase the proportion of women among the staff. Now, we still have to do a lot, but the representation of women among the staff is around 30 percent for the first time. We have passed the 30 percent mark and we have two female DDGs. I am expecting to have another female DDG to make representation at the highest level of staff equal – 50/ 50.

For that purpose, the IAEA Secretariat has undertaken a number of initiatives. We organized a panel discussion at the General Conference last year on the environment for women. We have encouraged Member States to make women available for technical cooperation training courses or as members of the missions that we send to countries.

We also organised the Safeguards Symposium in November of last year. We had panel discussions on how to improve the balance of men and women in the Safeguards Department. To be frank, the representation of women in the Safeguards Department is not that high. I can understand that, for women in their mid-30s or 40s, it is very difficult to leave home and spend a month in the field. I have had some discussion with them and they talked about some difficulties. There may be ways to address this issue and the panel discussion was very helpful for that.

We also organized a meeting for excellent, very capable women to share their stories and listen to the stories from leading women – both successful stories and difficult stories. This was very useful for women who are considering [becoming candidates] for higher posts.

We are also encouraging young women to study nuclear science. I visited high schools in the Philippines and the United States. I saw more women having an interest in nuclear technology than I thought. Many women are rather interested in biology and not very much in nuclear power plant operations. That is a fact, but it doesn’t mean that women are not interested in nuclear technology. They are interested, and I am very hopeful for their future.

The working environment is very important, and we are making some efforts. For example, we have strengthened our framework to address harassment and sexual harassment. There has been a change in the United Nations and perhaps we are the first international organization that amended our internal rules in line with the new UN rules. Of course, harassment or sexual harassment can take place between man and man or between woman and woman. But improving the harassment and sexual harassment policy will contribute to improve the working environment. From January this year, we introduced more flexible working hours to achieve a better work-life balance. I hope these efforts will lead to a better environment for women to work.

I have a sense of a change of trend – not very dramatic, but a gradual change. The staff survey shows that staff are happy with their work load. If you look more closely at women’s representation department by department, some departments have a quite high level of representation. For example, my office – DGOC – and the Management department have 48 percent – almost equal – and the Technical Cooperation department has 46 percent. Some other departments have strong potential to increase the representation of women. It is true that some departments have difficulties because of the nature of the work. But there are hopes that we can increase the representation of women among the staff. We need to take [both] a bottom-up approach and top-down approach. For example, having more women at the highest level of the Agency will help to change the atmosphere and the working environment.

At the same time, daily efforts are needed to look into recruitment and make a judgement in each recruitment process in order to increase the number of women. We have encouraged all recruitment officers to have this in mind when they are engaged in recruitment. Support from Member States is very crucial. I have found the golden rule in this area – if a company or country identifies a very capable woman…please introduce them to us. There is a high possibility that we can take them. Too bad for you, but we can benefit from that!

With this remark, thank you very much.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The 69th annual IAEA General Conference is coming to a close, with final discussions around possible resolutions likely to last into the evening.

Resolutions and decisions adopted at the conference will guide the IAEA’s activities in the coming year. They will be posted here as they become available.

This year, more than 3000 participants registered for the conference, including 2755 representatives from 153 of the180 IAEA Member States. High-ranking officials in attendance included 57 ministers and 37 vice-ministers. In addition, 348 representatives from international organizations and non-governmental organizations took part. The number of participants from non-governmental organizations has more than doubled since 2021, showing how the IAEA has been growing its engagement around the world.

In his opening statement to the General Conference on Monday, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi outlined how the Agency has been responding through its unique mandate to what he described as “extremely challenging times”.

“[The IAEA’s mandate] spans all the way from reducing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation — and ultimately therefore also the risk of nuclear war — to using nuclear science and technology to help feed families, light cities and care for children with cancer,” he said.

The General Conference and Board of Governors are the two IAEA policy making bodies. The Board examines and provides recommendations to the General Conference on the IAEA’s financial statements, programme and budget.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –