Category: IAEA

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) led a team of international experts to collect samples today of ALPS treated water stored at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station (FDNPS) prior to the water’s dilution with seawater and its discharge to the sea.

The sampling mission is the fourth under the additional measures, which focus on expanding international participation and transparency. These measures permit third parties to independently verify that water discharge which Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings (TEPCO) – operator of the FDNPS – began in August 2023 continues to be consistent with international safety standards.

International experts from Belgium, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and Switzerland, along with IAEA staff, conducted hands-on sampling of the water stored in tanks designated for the 14th batch of ALPS-treated water to be discharged.

The IAEA initiated the first practical steps of the additional measures in October last year. This fourth mission follows the mission in April which sampled diluted water just prior to its discharge into the sea, and a mission in February when IAEA Director General Grossi presided over the additional measures to  collect seawater samples in the vicinity of FDNPS.

The samples collected in today’s mission will be analysed by the participating laboratories – the Belgian Nuclear Research Centre, the China Institute of Atomic Energy, the Korean Institute for Nuclear Safety, the Institute for Problems of Environmental Monitoring of the Research and Production Association “Typhoon” in Russia and the Spiez Laboratory in Switzerland – as well as by the IAEA’s laboratory and TEPCO in Japan. All laboratories are members of the IAEA’s Analytical Laboratories for the Measurement of Environmental Radioactivity (ALMERA) network, which are selected for their high level of expertise and analytical proficiency.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Nuclear safety remains precarious at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and its six reactors cannot be restarted as long as the military conflict continues to jeopardize the situation at the site, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi told IAEA Member States this week.

Addressing the regular June meeting of the Board of Governors, the Director General briefed them about his 12th mission to Ukraine during the current conflict, which took place in early June, followed by a visit to Russia, which also focused on nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP.

Addressing the Board meeting, he highlighted “the extremely vulnerable” status of the off-site power supply at the site, which for more than a month now has relied on one single power line for the electricity it needs to cool its reactors and spent fuel. Before the conflict, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP) had access to ten power lines.

In addition, Director General Grossi noted that the ZNPP reactors’ “reliance on groundwater for cooling remains an interim solution, whilst in their cold shutdown state”.  The plant has depended on 11 groundwater wells since the downstream Kakhovka dam was destroyed two years ago.

In their meeting in Kyiv on 3 June, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy “made a point to recognize the importance of the IAEA’s permanent presence” at the ZNPP, the Director General told the Board, adding he had assured President Zelenskyy of the IAEA’s continued commitment to Ukraine’s nuclear safety and to helping it rebuild its energy infrastructure.

The Director General added: “As the military conflict moves further into its fourth year, Ukraine needs support, and the IAEA is providing it … it is also crucial to prepare for the reconstruction phase.”

At the ZNPP, the IAEA team based there has held several meetings with the ZNPP to discuss the site’s electrical system and also visited its 750 kilovolt (kV) switchyard.

Apart from the sole remaining 330 kV back-up line that was disconnected due to military activities on 7 May, the site does not know the current condition of its five other 330 kV lines, which remain unavailable after they were damaged outside of the ZNPP area early in the conflict.

The ZNPP said maintenance work was conducted at one of the four 750 kV power lines that was originally connected to the ZNPP before being damaged in 2022. Since the conflict, the ZNPP had lost access to three of its 750 kV lines.

In addition, the ZNPP informed the IAEA about a planned project to pump water into the cooling pond from the Dnipro River in order to maintain a water level that is sufficient to cool one operating reactor initially, followed by a second unit, until the pond reaches its full capacity. According to the site, a pumping station will be constructed to supply water directly to the cooling pond until the plant can rebuild the Kakhovka dam.

The exact location of the pumping station cannot yet be determined, as it depends on the security conditions, the ZNPP said, adding the project would only start once military activities cease.

Separately this week, the IAEA team was informed that that the Russian regulator, Rostekhnadzor, over the next two weeks will perform pre-licensing inspection activities at ZNPP reactor units 1 and 2, whose current operational licences issued by Ukraine are due to expire in December this year and in February 2026, respectively. The IAEA team has requested to observe these activities and will seek additional information regarding items such as the scope of these undertakings and any criteria for assessing nuclear safety.

Over the past several weeks, the IAEA team has also been monitoring a leak in one reactor unit’s essential service water system which delivers cooling water to the safety systems. The leak – which can occur in NPPs without any significant safety consequences – was discovered during maintenance and the team was informed that it was caused by corrosion. It has since been repaired.

The IAEA team reported hearing military activities on most days over the past weeks, at varying distances away from the ZNPP including last week’s purported drone attack on the site’s training centre.

The Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and the South Ukraine NPPs are continuing to operate amid the problems caused by the conflict. Three of their nine operating reactor units are still undergoing planned outages for refuelling and maintenance. The IAEA teams at these plants and the Chornobyl sites have continued to report on – and be informed about – nearby military activities, including drones observed flying nearby. Last Monday, the IAEA teams at Khmelnytskyy and Rivne were required to shelter.

Over the past two weeks, the IAEA teams based at these four sites have all rotated.

As part of the IAEA’s assistance programme to support nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, the Chornobyl site received essential items to improve staff living conditions and the National Scientific Centre Institute of Metrology received personal radiation detectors.

These deliveries were funded by Austria, Belgium, France and Norway and brought the total number of IAEA-coordinated deliveries since the start of the armed conflict to 140.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Early this morning, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was informed of the military operation launched by Israel which includes attacks on nuclear facilities in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

As I reported this morning to the IAEA Board of Governors, we have been in permanent contact with the Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority, to ascertain the status of relevant nuclear facilities and to assess any wider impacts on nuclear safety and security.

Iran has confirmed that at present, only the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant site has been attacked in today’s strikes. This facility contains the Fuel Enrichment Plant and the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant.

At Natanz, the above-ground part of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, where Iran was producing uranium enriched up to 60% U-235, has been destroyed.

Electricity infrastructure at the facility (electrical sub-station, main electric power supply building, emergency power supply and back-up generators) has been destroyed.

There is no indication of a physical attack on the underground cascade hall containing part of the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the main Fuel Enrichment Plant. However, the loss of power to the cascade hall may have damaged the centrifuges there.

The level of radioactivity outside the Natanz site has remained unchanged and at normal levels indicating no external radiological impact to the population or the environment from this event.

However, due to the impacts, there is radiological and chemical contamination inside the facilities in Natanz. The type of radiation present inside the facility, primarily alpha particles, is manageable with appropriate radiation protection measures.

At present, the Iranian authorities are informing us of attacks on the other facilities, the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant; and Esfahan site, where a fuel plate fabrication plant, a fuel manufacturing plant, a uranium conversion facility and an enriched UO2 powder plant are located. However I have to inform that at this moment we do not have enough information beyond indicating that military activity has been taking place around these facilities as well which initially had not been part of military operation.

All these developments are deeply concerning. I have repeatedly stated that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the context or circumstances, as it could harm both people and the environment.  Such attacks have serious implications for nuclear safety, security and safeguards, as well as regional and international peace and security.

In this regard, the IAEA recalls the numerous General Conference resolutions on the topic of military attacks against nuclear facilities, in particular, GC(XXIX)/RES/444 and GC(XXXIV)/RES/533, which provide, inter alia, that “any armed attack on and threat against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes constitutes a violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law and the Statute of the Agency”. 

Furthermore, the IAEA has consistently underlined that “armed attacks on nuclear facilities could result in radioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the State which has been attacked”, as was stated in GC(XXXIV)/RES/533.

As Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and consistent with the objectives of the IAEA under the IAEA Statute, I call on all parties to exercise maximum restraint to avoid further escalation. I reiterate that any military action that jeopardizes the safety and security of nuclear facilities risks grave consequences for the people of Iran, the region, and beyond.

Madame Under Secretary General evoked that yesterday, the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted an important resolution on Iran’s safeguards obligations. In addition to this, the Board resolution stressed its support for a diplomatic solution to the problems posed by the Iranian nuclear programme.

The IAEA continues to monitor the situation closely.  Our Incident and Emergency Center (IEC) has maintained continuous contact with Iranian authorities from the onset of the attack, regularly confirming the status of the facilities and will continue to do so in the coming days. Additionally, we have established a task force comprising several senior staff members to monitor the situation closely over the next few days, and they will be available 24/7at the disposal of the UNSC.

The IAEA stands ready to provide technical assistance, and remains committed to its nuclear safety, security and safeguards mandate in all circumstances. I stand ready to engage with all relevant parties to help ensure the protection of nuclear facilities and the continued peaceful use of nuclear technology in accordance with the Agency mandate, including, deploying Agency nuclear security and safety experts (in addition to our safeguards inspectors in Iran) wherever necessary to ensure that nuclear installations are fully protected and continue to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

As I informed today the IAEA Board of Governors, I have indicated to the respective authorities my readiness to travel at the earliest to assess the situation and ensure safety, security and non-proliferation in Iran.

I have also been in contact with our inspectors in Iran and Israel. The safety of our staff is of paramount importance. All necessary actions are being taken to ensure they are not harmed.

Despite the current military actions and heightened tensions, it is clear that the only sustainable path forward—for Iran, for Israel, the entire region, and the international community—is one grounded in dialogue and diplomacy to ensure peace, stability, and cooperation. 

The International Atomic Energy Agency, as the International technical institution entrusted with overseeing the peaceful use of nuclear energy, remains a unique and vital forum for dialogue, especially now. 

In accordance with its Statute and longstanding mandate, the IAEA provides the framework and natural platform where facts prevail over rhetoric and where engagement can replace escalation. 

I reaffirm the Agency’s readiness to facilitate technical discussions and support efforts that promote transparency, safety, security and the peaceful resolution of nuclear-related issues in Iran.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

(As prepared for delivery)

As the armed conflict in Ukraine enters its fourth year, the nuclear safety and security situation throughout the country continues to be highly precarious. The presence of the IAEA at all Ukrainian nuclear facilities has been and continues to be an invaluable asset to the international community and must be preserved.

The IAEA remains present at Ukraine’s nuclear power plant facilities. Difficult conditions have in the past month complicated and delayed one rotation of experts, which was safely completed in recent days. Back in December, a drone hit and severely damaged an IAEA official vehicle during a rotation. As I reported to you in the special Board meeting shortly afterward, staff survived this unacceptable attack unharmed, but the rear of the vehicle was destroyed. Other episodes followed, confirming the dangerous situation.

Around Ukraine, the Khmelnitsky NPP, the Rivne NPP and the South Ukraine NPP, continue to operate amid serious challenges, including on the electricity infrastructure, a major risk to the reliable and stable supply of power crucial for the safe operation of NPPs. The electrical grid’s ability to provide a reliable off-site power supply to Ukrainian NPPs was further reduced by damage sustained following military attacks in November and December 2024, a mission of IAEA experts that visited and assessed seven critical electrical substations concluded late last year. Considering the seriousness of the situation, I visited the Kyivska electrical substation last month to observe the damage sustained first hand. On what was my 11th visit to Ukraine since the start of the war, I also met with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, reiterating the IAEA’s commitment to supporting nuclear safety and security in Ukraine and our readiness to support the country’s plans to expand nuclear power at Khmelnytskyy NPP. Consultations with Moscow have also taken place and will continue, in the interest of nuclear safety and security at Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant.

At Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), where the 6 reactor units are in cold shutdown, the status of the off-site power supply remains extremely vulnerable. For about one week ZNPP had to rely on a single off-site power line following the loss of its only remaining back-up line, confirming the extremely fragile situation. 

Last month at the Chornobyl site a drone caused significant damage to the structure built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor damaged in the 1986 accident and to protect it from external hazards. Although this attack did not result in any radioactive release, it nevertheless underlines the persistent risk to nuclear safety during this military conflict.

Since the Board gathered for its last regular meeting in November 2024, the Agency has arranged 31 deliveries of nuclear safety, security and medical equipment and supplies to Ukraine, bringing the total so far to 108 deliveries valued at more than EUR 15.6 million. The Agency also has initiated the first phase of its support on safety and security of radioactive sources in Ukraine.

We are grateful to all 30 donor states and the European Union for their extrabudgetary contributions, and I encourage those who can, to support the delivery of the comprehensive assistance programme, for which EUR 22 million are necessary.

As reflected in my latest report to the Board on Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine, I would like to reiterate that all the IAEA’s activities in Ukraine are being conducted in line with relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and of the IAEA policy-making organs.

Madame Chairperson,

In February, I travelled to Fukushima to participate in collecting water samples off the coast of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. I did this together with scientists from China, Korea and Switzerland as part of additional measures to promote transparency and build trust in the region during the ongoing release of ALPS-treated water from the plant. Additional measures focus on expanding international participation and transparency, allowing hands-on independent measurements of the concentration level of the water. This work is conducted within agreed parameters set by the IAEA in its role as an independent, impartial and technical organization.  IAEA officials and experts from laboratories from China, France, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland also sampled ALPS -treated water – prior to dilution – from measurement/confirmation tanks on the premises at the site. The IAEA has maintained its independent monitoring and analysis efforts, confirming that tritium concentrations in the discharged batches remain far below operational limits.

In December 2024, an IAEA Task Force concluded that the approach TEPCO, and the Government of Japan are taking continues to align with international safety standards.

While in Japan, I also visited facilities where soil removed after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station accident is safely stored, managed, and recycled, an effort the IAEA has been supporting by working to ensure it meets international safety standards.

You have before you the Nuclear Safety Review 2025 and the Nuclear Security Review 2025. Both documents present, in their respective areas, an analytical overview, the global trends, and the Agency’s main activities in 2024. They also identify the top priorities for the years ahead.

This month the inaugural meeting of the Nuclear Security Working Group established under the Nuclear Harmonization and Standardization Initiative’s Regulatory Track will identify nuclear security topics of common interest amongst participating States and share regulatory approaches, good practices and lessons learned in ensuring the security of SMRs.

Our preparatory work in advance of the launch of Atomic Technology Licensed for Applications at Sea (ATLAS) later this year is progressing. ATLAS will provide a framework to enable the peaceful maritime uses of nuclear technology, a prospect that is generating significant interest.

Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention) later this month will participate in the 8th Review Meeting to study National Reports with the aim of improving safety in radioactive waste and spent fuel management.

December saw the start of a new project supporting the establishment of sustainable regulatory infrastructure for radiation safety and the security of radioactive material in Central East Asia and the Pacific Islands.

In June, Romania will host ConvEx-3, the IAEA’s highest level and most complex emergency exercise. In the event of an incident with transboundary implications, Member States will be called upon to implement a harmonized response and therefore this exercise will have a particular focus on regional collaboration.

The International Conference on Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response will be held in December in Riyadh in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Madame Chairperson,

Today, 417 nuclear power reactors operating in 31 countries make up almost 377 gigawatts of installed capacity, providing just under 10 per cent of the world’s total electricity and a quarter of its low-carbon supply.

It is clear that countries are turning more and more to nuclear energy. In the IAEA’s high case scenario, global nuclear electricity generating capacity is seen increasing two and a half times by 2050.  Delivering on that promise will require public support. That is why the first IAEA International Conference on Stakeholder Engagement for Nuclear Power Programmes will gather governments, industry and practitioners from around the world in the final week of May. Mayors of municipalities with nuclear power facilities from around the world will share their experiences. No one is better placed to assess the impact and contribution to the community of nuclear facilities than those living there.

Following our first Nuclear Stakeholder Engagement School, hosted by the Abdus Salam International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy last November, we are now planning two more later this year. In addition, we have also established a new Stakeholder Engagement Advisory Service, which will help countries assess and strengthen their stakeholder engagement programmes.

The use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly evolving and growing in all spheres of life, including in nuclear science and technology. AI data centres require a lot of energy and nuclear reactors provide clean, reliable, and adaptable options, including in the form of SMRs and micro reactors.  Meanwhile, the integration of AI into the nuclear sector offers the chance to streamline operations across the nuclear power project life cycle. In this context the IAEA will host the International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Energy this December. We look forward to welcoming as many of you as possible to this important and first-of-a-kind event here at the Agency’s headquarters.

Within the Secretariat we are also intent on making the most of AI while mitigating its risks, therefore we have established official guidelines, a portal and a community of practice.

Our work on fusion continues apace with the publication of Experiences for Consideration in Fusion Plant Design Safety and Safety Assessment.

Madame Chairperson,

The Nuclear Technology Review before you highlights key advancements in nuclear applications that support Member States in addressing critical priorities. This year’s review places particular emphasis on innovations in food safety and authenticity, energy security, early disease detection and cancer treatment, environmental sustainability, and advanced manufacturing.

In November, the IAEA hosted the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications and the Technical Cooperation Programme. The Ministerial Declaration recognized both the critical role of nuclear science, technology, and applications in tackling global challenges, and the important role of the Technical Cooperation programme as a key mechanism in transferring, expanding and further accelerating Member State access to nuclear technology, materials, equipment and expertise for peaceful purposes.

I am pleased to report the IAEA’s technical cooperation programme achieved an implementation rate of 86% in 2024. We provided our emergency assistance to Türkiye and Syria, assessing damage to civil structures following the earthquakes and building the capacities of Turkish and Syrian experts in non-destructive testing. We initiated procurement to reinstate X-ray and laboratory services in Grenada and Honduras in the aftermath of Hurricane Beryl and Tropical Storm Sara, and we aided oil-spill clean-up efforts in Trinidad and Tobago.

In 2024, the Rate of Attainment for contributions to the TC Fund was 95%, underscoring Member States’ commitment to our work. To ensure resources for the TC programme are sufficient, assured and predicable, I urge Member States to contribute on time, and in full, to the TC Fund.

Our flagship initiatives are making progress across the globe. Under Atoms4Food, about 27 countries from all regions have officially requested support. Member States have pledged almost EUR 9 million, two thirds of which was contributed by Japan to support livestock production in Côte d’Ivoire, food safety in Mauritania, and molecular laboratories in Vietnam, among other projects.

Our network of international partnerships has grown with Memoranda of Understanding having been signed with Anglo American, CGIAR, and the Inter-American Institute of Cooperation in Agriculture (IICA). The partnership with Anglo American focuses on combating soil salinization through climate-smart agricultural practices.

While I was in Japan last month, I signed a partnership with Sumitomo Corporation, one of the world’s largest integrated trading companies, to cooperate particularly in the area of sustainable uses of nuclear related technologies for multiple areas, including healthcare, shipping, fusion and capacity building efforts.  

Under Rays of Hope, the Anchor Centre in Argentina held its first capacity-building event to strengthen paediatric radiotherapy services in Latin America and the Caribbean, creating a regional network for knowledge exchange and support.

In January 2025, the IAEA conducted its first national-level quality assurance audit in diagnostic radiology, reviewing 16 hospitals in Qatar.

The International Conference on Advances in Radiation Oncology (ICARO-4) will take place in the first week of June, focusing on emerging radiotherapy techniques to address global health challenges.

Under the Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC), a novel surveillance technology for high-risk pathogens was transferred to the IAEA’s Animal Production and Health Laboratory in November and will soon be passed on to Member States. New funding pledges from the Republic of Korea, Portugal, and Japan are supporting ZODIAC’s coordinated research projects in Asia and Africa, as well as the development of AI-driven platforms for zoonotic disease monitoring.

Under NUTEC Plastics 104 Member States are engaged in microplastic monitoring, with 42 developing recycling technologies. Four countries in Asia-Pacific and Latin America have validated radiation-based upcycling technology at lab scale, with private sector collaboration helping to build up operations. China is developing a pilot-scale facility, bringing the total number of countries promoting the technology to nine.

In November this year, the International High-Level Forum on NUclear TEChnology for Controlling Plastic Pollution (NUTEC-Plastics): Scaling Solutions and Partnerships for Global Impact will take place in the Philippines. I thank the Philippines Government for hosting this important milestone.

The Global Water Analysis Laboratory Network (GloWAL) baseline survey has received 85 responses from 65 countries, informing future activities. Its first coordination meeting for the Spanish-speaking Latin America and the Caribbean is underway.

Under ReNuAL 2, the construction of new greenhouses in Seibersdorf is nearing completion and the modernized laboratories will be ready to welcome staff soon.  

Madame Chairperson,

Regarding the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme, you have before you my latest report on verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Following my last report, Iran’s stockpile of uranium enriched up to 60% U‑235 has increased to 275 kg, up from 182 kg in the past quarter. Iran is the only non-nuclear weapon State enriching to this level, causing me serious concern.

It has been four years since Iran stopped implementing its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), including provisionally applying its Additional Protocol and therefore it is also four years since the Agency was able to conduct complementary access in Iran.

You also have before you my report on the NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran says it has declared all nuclear material, activities and locations required under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. However, this statement is inconsistent with the Agency’s findings of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at undeclared locations in Iran. The Agency needs to know the current location(s) of the nuclear material and/or of contaminated equipment involved.

There is also a discrepancy in the material balance of uranium involved in uranium metal production experiments conducted at Jaber Ibn Hayan Mutlipurpose Laboratory, for which Iran has not accounted.

Having stated it had suspended such implementation, Iran still is not implementing modified Code 3.1, which is a legal obligation for Iran.

I am seriously concerned that the outstanding safeguards issues remain unresolved. They stem from Iran’s obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful.

I deeply regret that Iran, despite having indicated a willingness to consider accepting the designation of four additional experienced Agency inspectors, did not accept their designation.

There has been no significant progress towards implementing the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023. I call upon Iran urgently to implement the Joint Statement through serious engagement.

In response to the Board’s request in its resolution of November 2024, I will produce a comprehensive and updated assessment on the presence and use of undeclared nuclear material in connection with past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme.

High-level engagement is indispensable to making real progress. My visit to Tehran last November, and meetings with President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi indicate that there may be room for constructive compromises. I hope to see them again soon and pursue effective dialogue and tangible results.

The Board has before it for approval a draft Additional Protocol for Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

I have made it a priority to strengthen the legal framework for safeguards. Since the last Board meeting in November, Oman, Mongolia, Cyprus, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zambia have amended their original Small Quantities Protocols and Saudi Arabia has rescinded its original SQP. The number of States with safeguards agreements in force remains 191, and 143 of these States have additional protocols in force. I call upon the remaining three States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without comprehensive safeguards agreements to bring such agreements into force without delay. I also encourage States that have not yet concluded additional protocols to do so as soon as possible, and I reiterate my repeated calls for the remaining 14 States with SQPs based on the original standard text to amend or rescind them as soon as possible. Let me assure you that I will continue to use my good offices to strengthen the indispensable legal framework on which the continued peaceful uses of nuclear science and technology rest.

The IAEA continues to monitor the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear programme.

The Agency has observed that the 5MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon resumed operation in mid-October 2024, following a shutdown period of approximately 60 days. This shutdown is assessed to be of sufficient length to refuel the reactor and start its seventh operational cycle. Strong indicators of preparations for a new reprocessing campaign, including the operation of the steam plant serving the Radiochemical Laboratory, have been observed.

In late-January 2025, the DPRK released photographs of General Secretary Kim Jong Un visiting “the nuclear material production base and the Nuclear Weapons Institute”. The depicted centrifuge cascades and infrastructure are consistent with the layout of a centrifuge enrichment facility and with the structure of the Yongbyon Uranium Enrichment Plant. This development follows the DPRK’s publication in September 2024 of photographs of an undeclared enrichment facility at the Kangson Complex. The undeclared enrichment facilities at both Kangson and Yongbyon, combined with General Secretary Kim’s call for “overfulfilling the plan for producing weapons-grade nuclear materials,” are of serious concern. There are indications that the uranium enrichment plants at Kangson and Yongbyon continue to operate, and there are indications that the light water reactor (LWR) at Yongbyon continues to operate. Additions to the support infrastructure have been observed adjacent to the LWR.

There were no indications of significant changes at the Nuclear Test Site at Punggye-ri, which remains prepared to support a nuclear test.

The continuation and further development of the DPRK’s nuclear programme are clear violations of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and are deeply regrettable. I call upon the DPRK to comply fully with its obligations under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to cooperate promptly with the Agency in the full and effective implementation of its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to resolve all outstanding issues, especially those that have arisen during the absence of Agency inspectors from the country. The Agency continues to maintain its enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK’s nuclear programme.

Concerning the safety of the LWR, we lack the necessary information to make an assessment. Safety should always be a paramount consideration when operating a reactor. Nuclear safety is a sovereign responsibility of the State and the IAEA supports the States in this area.

Following the change of Government in the Syrian Arab Republic towards the end of 2024, I have written to the new Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates. I requested cooperation with the Agency to enable us to fulfill our obligation to verify nuclear material and facilities under Syria’s safeguards agreement. I conveyed the importance of continuing and reinforcing cooperation between Syria and the Agency to address unresolved issues. Clarifying these issues remains essential to Syria demonstrating its commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and international peace and security.

I hope to be able to engage with the new government soon. Bringing total clarity to the situation regarding past activities in this field in Syria is indispensable to the realization of current efforts to modernize the country and put it on a firm path to peace and development.

In April and May, the IAEA will participate in the Third Preparatory Meeting for the 2026 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in New York.

Madame Chairperson,

The IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska‑Curie Fellowship Programme has been expanding the talent base for the nuclear field since 2020 with 760 female students and graduates from 121 Member States so far having been supported in studying in 72 countries. In the current, fifth cycle, we selected 200 candidates from 109 countries. I would like to thank Member States that have contributed so far. For this programme to continue accepting new fellowship candidates it urgently needs further support. I ask those who can, to support this endeavor. 

This year, we have planned three Lise Meitner Programme cohorts, in Argentina, Canada and Japan. They are focused on nuclear power, advanced nuclear technologies and research reactors.

I am happy to report that we have reached parity, women now make up half the staff in the professional and higher categories. This is up from about 30% when I took office in 2019.

I thank Member States who have paid their regular budget contributions, including some who paid in advance. It is important that all Member States pay their contributions in a timely manner. This will ensure liquidity of the regular budget throughout the year, allowing the Agency to carry out its activities effectively.

You recently received for your consideration my proposed programme and budget for the 2026-2027 biennium.

It has been prepared with due consideration of the constraints of the prevailing financial environment. Despite increasing demands and higher operational costs, I have decided for the third time in a row to propose a zero real growth budget. The proposal maintains balance among the different programmes and emphasises my commitment to ensuring our resources are managed with discipline, efficiency and restraint so that we maximize the impact of the Agency’s work.

This being our first Board meeting of 2025, I want to conclude by saying that I look forward to making 2025 a successful year in which the IAEA benefits all Member States as we advance our common goals of peace and development.