Category: IAEA

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The IAEA has been monitoring the situation on the reported military activities taking place in the vicinity of the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant (NPP).

This NPP has six units of two different reactor types: RBMK-1000 and VVER-510. Two of the RBMK-1000 are in shutdown and two are fully operational. The two VVER-510 units are under construction.

In view of the reportedly significant military activity, I wish to remind all parties of the seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. Additionally, I emphasize the five concrete principles to help to ensure nuclear safety and security which have been established for the Zaporizhzhya NPP in the context of the current conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, and which are equally applicable in this situation. These include, among others, the imperative to ensure the physical integrity of a nuclear power plant. This is valid irrespective of where an NPP is situated.

At this juncture, I would like to appeal to all sides to exercise maximum restraint in order to avoid a nuclear accident with the potential for serious radiological consequences. I am personally in contact with the relevant authorities of both countries and will continue to be seized of the matter. I will continue to update the international community as appropriate.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

When we met the last time, at ICONS 2020, many of us could not have imagined the momentous change we would experience between then and today, change that would affect billions of people, international peace and security, and nuclear security. A global pandemic was in the making and a war – in Ukraine – for first time soon would be fought among the facilities of one of Europe’s biggest nuclear power programmes.

Meanwhile, profound technological advances have been made. Assessing their impact on nuclear security is a crucial task. Artificial Intelligence, and unmanned vehicles pose both a threat to nuclear security and offer new tools with which to enhance it. In the nuclear field itself, Small Modular Reactors promise new opportunities for applications such as desalination and power brought to remote communities via barge, but also require us to consider new security elements.

The use of nuclear science and technology, often facilitated by the IAEA, has come on in leaps and bounds. Climate change and the drive for energy security are fuelling a desire for nuclear power. At this past Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, COP28, world leaders – those whose states use nuclear power and those whose do not – for the first time in nearly 30 years of COP meetings agreed nuclear power must be part of the transition to net zero. More than 20 countries have signed a pledge towards tripling nuclear power capacity and at the IAEA’s Nuclear Energy Summit in March heads of state agreed on the urgent need for conducive financial conditions. 

Nuclear security is relevant throughout all the steps of the nuclear fuel cycle and is part of the social contract that underpins the existence and growth of nuclear power. Nuclear power programmes require national nuclear security threat assessments and “security by design”. Nurturing relevant research and a strong security culture are key, not only in countries with NPPs.

The use of life-saving and life-affirming applications of nuclear science and technology is growing, from cancer patients gaining access to radiotherapy to farmers benefiting from new crop varieties developed with the help of irradiation. IAEA initiative such as Rays of Hope: Cancer care for all; Nutec Plastics; Zoonotic Disease Integrated Action (ZODIAC); and Atoms4Food are key vehicles facilitating wider access.

All these opportunities to use nuclear and radioactive material depend on a strong and adaptive global nuclear security regime. For countries new to using nuclear and radioactive material, this means building up legal infrastructure, practices and culture that bolster nuclear security.  Nationally and across borders, collaboration and laser-focused vigilance are key to preventing groups with malicious intent from using nuclear and radioactive material to cause panic and harm.

The threats to nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities are real and varied. The international nuclear security threat landscape keeps evolving. Today, anyone can type a few words into a computer and generative AI can create images of nuclear Armageddon, meaning it is now possible to spread panic about radiation fallout without a nuclear device. Risk scenarios include theft of nuclear and other radioactive material for use in improvised devices and sabotage at nuclear installations or during transport of nuclear and radioactive material. The risk of cyber-attacks requires the implementation of computer security programmes by those who use nuclear power and those who don’t. Risks come from outsiders and from those within the fold who are disgruntled or have been corrupted.

Nuclear security is the national responsibility of individual states, but it also benefits enormously from close collaboration and the enabling role of the IAEA.  ICONS, which started in 2013, has been the place for ministers, policymakers, senior officials, and experts to gather to assesses current priorities, prepare for new challenges, and engage in scenario-based policy discussions. ICONS 2024, presided over by the co-presidents, HE Tim Watts, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia and HE Sungat Yessimkhanov, Vice-Minister of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, covers the themes of policy, law and regulation; technology and infrastructure for prevention, detection and response; capacity building; and cross-cutting areas, such as the interface between nuclear security and nuclear safety. ICONS is the most important high-level international meeting on nuclear security. At this time of heightened tensions, it is imperative that there remains a unity of purpose and that nuclear security does not become a political football.

This year marks the 10-year anniversary of the IAEA’s Division of Nuclear Security. The IAEA is at the forefront of adapting nuclear security to new challenges, including war. The seven indispensable pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security have broad international support. They have brought crucial clarity at a time of war and are testament to the adaptiveness of the IAEA and the security regime.

Those seven pillars are backed up by an enormous ongoing effort by the IAEA to support Ukraine, including through the continuous presence of IAEA experts at all of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, including Zaporizhzhya NPP on the front lines of the war. When there were allegations of nuclear security breaches, the IAEA was there to investigate with impartiality and science. We set the facts straight that no nuclear material had been diverted, cutting through the fog of war, and diffusing a tense situation.   

Not all our efforts require quite as much courage as our experts have shown in Ukraine, nor do they make international headlines. But every day, the IAEA – the Secretariat and the Member States – work together fastidiously to underpin nuclear security, never resting, always learning.

Radioactive sources are extensively used in many domains, including medicine, industry, agriculture and research. An incident in one State can have far-reaching consequences for others, so security for one is security for all. That means supporting States with no, or less developed nuclear security infrastructure makes everyone safer. That support, which often comes via the IAEA, includes making lawmakers aware of their responsibilities.

Nuclear Security requires the implementation of appropriate and robust legislative regulatory frameworks. In 2022, the first Conference of the Parties to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM) was held under the auspices of the IAEA. Reflecting the global importance of the legal framework and of nuclear security, parties managed to agree an outcome document and for the IAEA convene a subsequent conference. Since 2020, 14 new parties have joined the A/CPPNM bringing the total to 136. Five new Parties joined the CPPNM, bringing that total to 164. In addition to the A/CPPNM, political commitment to legally non-binding instruments, like the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and its supplementary guidance, is a strong indication of radiation safety and nuclear security culture.

But legal frameworks are just the beginning. They must be implemented. The IAEA plays a central role in assisting its Members States so they are able to do that. Last year we inaugurated the most visible symbol of our collaboration: the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC). This first-of-its-kind space, made possible by 15 donors, is a cornerstone for capacity building amid the growing need for sophisticated hands-on nuclear security training using advanced, specialized equipment. The NSTDC is part of a wide range of services offered by the IAEA, including peer reviews, such as the International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS), of which there have now been more than 100, and Advisory Missions on Regulatory Infrastructure for Radiation Safety and Nuclear Security (RISS), a service we launched in 2022. Our Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) now has 145 members and has enabled the reporting of more than 600 incidents in which nuclear or radioactive material went out of regulatory control.  Almost 8,000 people have benefited from our training in nuclear security, and we continue to work very hard to remove barriers that prevent talent from entering the field.  In March 2021, we launched the Women in Nuclear Security Initiative (WINSI) to support the achievement of gender equality in nuclear security. Meanwhile, the IAEA’s Marie Sklodowska Curie Fellowship Programme financially supports women pursuing a master’s degree in nuclear subjects and offers them internships, while our Lise Meitner offers women in the early and middle part of their career enriching opportunities within the field.   

As the use of nuclear and other radioactive material around the world increases, more and more States are needing to increase their level of nuclear security. Nuclear security is as important as nuclear safety – we must put it on equal footing in terms of reliability of funding and the robustness of implementation.

At ICONS 2024 we are – as the name of the conference indicates – “shaping the future”, not only of nuclear security, but of the world our children will inherit. That is because nuclear security is about more than preventing nuclear terrorism. It is an enabler to providing, through nuclear science and technology, the clean energy; cutting-edge medicine; nutritious food and hope for a better tomorrow.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

(As prepared for delivery)

I thank the President of the Security Council in allowing me the opportunity today to update you on IAEA activities concerning nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine. I also thank the Council for their continuing support for the IAEA’s efforts.

I have addressed the Council on the situation in Ukraine five times before, on 4 March, 11 August, 6 September, 27 October in 2022, and 30 May last year.

It is now nearly two years since the beginning of the war, and I remind you that it is the first time in history that a war is being fought amid the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.

This includes several of Ukraine’s five nuclear power plants and other facilities that have come under direct shelling. All NPPs have lost off-site power at some point.

Furthermore, one of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants, the Zaporizhzhya NPP, has been under Russian operational control with the presence of Russian troops on-site for almost all of that time.

And as you know the IAEA has been closely monitoring the situation and assisting Ukraine every single day since the start of the war.

Shortly after the start of the war, I elaborated the Seven Indispensable Pillars for ensuring nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict. These are:

1. The physical integrity of facilities – whether it is the reactors, fuel ponds or radioactive waste stores – must be maintained.
2. All safety and security systems and equipment must be fully functional at all times.
3. The operating staff must be able to fulfil their safety and security duties and have the capacity to make decisions free of undue pressure.
4. There must be a secure off-site power supply from the grid for all nuclear sites.
5. There must be uninterrupted logistical supply chains and transportation to and from the sites.
6. There must be effective on-site and off-site radiation monitoring systems, and emergency preparedness and response measures.
7. There must be reliable communication with the regulator and others.

And in my previous update to the Council on 30 May I reported that, as a result of intensive consultations with the leadership of Ukraine, as well as of the Russian Federation, I had further established five concrete principles for the ZNPP in order to prevent a nuclear accident and ensure the integrity of the plant, namely:

1. There should be no attack of any kind from or against the plant, in particular targeting the reactors, spent fuel storage, other critical infrastructure, or personnel;
2. ZNPP should not be used as storage or a base for heavy weapons (i.e. multiple rocket launchers, artillery systems and munitions, and tanks) or military personnel that could be used for an attack from the plant;
3. Off-site power to the plant should not be put at risk. To that effect, all efforts should be made to ensure that off-site power remains available and secure at all times;
4. All structures, systems and components essential to the safe and secure operation of ZNPP should be protected from attacks or acts of sabotage;
5. No action should be taken that undermines these principles.

I said that these commitments are essential to avoid the danger of a catastrophic nuclear incident and I had respectfully and solemnly asked both sides to observe them.

I was pleased that at that meeting last May distinguished Members of the Security Council and Ukraine clearly supported those principles.

Furthermore, I said that the experts on the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ), who have been on-site since 1 September 2022, would report to me on the observance of these principles and that I would report publicly on any violations.

Now nine months later, I wish to report today on the nuclear safety security and safeguards situation in Ukraine, and the Agency’s continued activities including the Agency’s assessment against the seven pillars and our monitoring of these five principles.

Mr. President,

Firstly, I wish to report on the scope and extent of our activities over nearly two years,

There has been a total of 102 missions to Ukraine. I have personally led eight of them, including three to ZNPP and I will shortly be leading another one to ZNPP within the next two weeks.

We have the 15th ISAMZ team of our dedicated and courageous international staff at the ZNPP, a plant that is still on the front lines of this war and our staff who still have to cross that front line to undertake this vital work. 37 of our staff have been part of these teams at ZNPP, a number of them more than once.

For a year we have had other dedicated IAEA experts stationed at every other major Ukrainian nuclear site: Rivne NPP, South Ukraine NPP, Khmelnytskyy NPP and at the Chornobyl NPP – their presence allowing us to provide the international community with reliable information on the nuclear safety and security situation at each of those sites as well. More than 100 of our staff have been part of these teams, totalling more than 3662 person-days of our staff in Ukraine.

Since I last addressed you, thanks to the generosity of Member States, the Agency has purchased armoured vehicles and recruited additional staff, security officers and drivers, and now manages our own security for the missions, thereby relieving some of the pressures on the United Nations Departments of Safety and Security and Operational Support.

We continue to facilitate an international assistance package now totalling more than €8.5 million with 34 deliveries of vital equipment to Ukraine, and I again thank Member States for their contributions.

We have developed a proposal for the Agency to provide advice, training, and equipment in the area of the safety and security of radioactive sources in Ukraine.

We have put together a programme of health care assistance including through equipment and psychological support for all Ukrainian nuclear workers.

I also announced the new programme for assistance of the Kherson Oblast aimed at managing the adverse impact associated with the flooding after the Kakhovka dam destruction and we work with Ukraine to identify their immediate needs in this area.

In addition to our work on nuclear safety and security we are also continuing our vital safeguards verification activities across Ukraine, ensuring that there is no diversion of nuclear material for military purposes. Based on these activities the Agency has not found any indication that would give rise to a proliferation concern.

And we are keeping the world informed of the situation at Ukraine’s nuclear sites with now well over 200 web statements and updates, 9 reports and multiple briefings, including to the United Nations General Assembly and to your distinguished selves at the Security Council. Thanks to this, the international community has at its disposal timely, technically sound and objective information, thus avoiding the risks associated with lack of information and misinformation, including misperceptions which might lead to decisions with serious implications.

Mr. President,

The nuclear safety and security situation at the ZNPP – in particular – continues to be extremely fragile.

The plant’s six reactors have been shut down since mid-2022 – five of them in cold shutdown and one in hot shutdown. But the potential dangers of a major nuclear accident remain very real.

Although the plant has not been shelled for a considerable time, significant military activities continue in the region and sometime in the vicinity of the facility, with our staff reporting rockets flying overhead close to the plant, thereby putting at risk the physical integrity of the plant.

The plant needs secure and uninterrupted sources of external cooling water. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam in early June last year, just days after I last reported to the Council, led to a large reduction in the water level of the reservoir. Consequently, the depth of the water in the reservoir was no longer sufficient to supply water and considerable efforts on site were needed, including the drilling of wells on site, to provide sufficient cooling water for the six shutdown reactor units.

The plant has been operating on significantly reduced staff, who are under unprecedented psychological pressure – which despite the reactors being shut-down is not sustainable.

The reduced number of qualified and trained operating personnel and the challenging supply chain has had a negative impact on the maintenance of equipment which is essential for maintaining the safety of the plant.  

And there have now been eight occasions when the site lost all off-site power and had to rely on emergency diesel generators, the last line of defence against a nuclear accident, to provide essential cooling of the reactor and spent fuel.

The plant is currently relying on just two lines of external power, and sometimes just one, or for a period the backup power was not properly configured. This demonstrates the highly precarious situation regarding essential off-site power.

There are occasions when the team has not had timely access to some areas of the plant. The IAEA teams need access in order to be able to effectively conduct their assessment of the situation regarding nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP and to reflect on the new developments.

Turning now to the five concrete principles, the Agency has been monitoring observance of these principles, and there have been no indications that the five concrete principles are not being observed. Nevertheless, in line with the evolving situation, the Agency needs to have timely access to all areas of the ZNPP of significance for nuclear safety and security, to monitor that all five concrete principles are being observed at all times.

We also should not forget the other nuclear facilities in Ukraine which are operating, most of the reactor units at full capacity. Although our teams continue to report that nuclear safety and security is maintained, they are also confirming the looming threat of military conflict and at some plants having to take shelter on several occasions. I wish to remind the Council that the availability of off-site power is essential to ensure their safe operation.

Mr. President,

A nuclear accident has not yet happened. This is true. But complacency could still lead us to tragedy. That should not happen. We must do everything in our power to minimize the risk that it does. And I am grateful for the continuing support from Member States – including financial support.

And we must be clear about the nature of the five principles established in this very chamber on 30 May last year. They are not an arms control or armistice agreement. They are not the solution to all the tragic problems this war has brought.

Instead, they are a creative, practical arrangement which has a very defined aim: to save Ukraine, Europe, and the world from a major nuclear accident with significant radiological consequences.

So far, this limited but crucial objective has been achieved. But we should not be complacent – we should take nothing for granted. Utmost restraint is a must, from all sides.

I am asking this Council for continued support for the seven pillars and the five principles, and for the IAEA’s role in monitoring the situation, in the service of the international community.

And I thank the Council, and you Mr President, for inviting me today thereby demonstrating its continuing focus on this critical issue.

The IAEA and myself remain at your disposal for updates, clarifications and action, where so required, to assist this body in its mission to preserve international peace and security.

Thank you, Mr President.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The IAEA Board of Governors will convene a meeting at the Agency’s headquarters starting at 10:00 CEST on Monday, 16 June, in Board Room C, Building C, 4th floor, in the Vienna International Centre (VIC).

The meeting is convened by the Chair of the Board following a request from the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation for “an urgent session of the IAEA Board of Governors on the matter related to the Israeli attacks against the Iranian nuclear facilities that are under the IAEA safeguards”.

The Board of Governors meeting is closed to the press.

Photo Opportunity 

There will be a photo opportunity with the IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and the Chair of the Board, Ambassador Matilda Aku Alomatu Osei-Agyeman of Ghana, before the start of the Board meeting, on 16 June at 10:00 CEST in Board Room C, in the C building in the VIC. 

Accreditation and Press Working Area:

The Press Room on the M-Building’s ground floor will be available as a press working area starting from 9:00 CEST on 16 June.

Journalists are requested to register with the Press Office by 08:00 CEST on Monday, 16 June. Please email press@iaea.org.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Update: IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi is expected to hold a press conference at 12:30 CEST on Monday, 9 June, in the Press Room of the M building. 

A live video stream of the press conference will be available. The IAEA will provide video footage of the press conference and the Director General’s opening Board of Governor’s statement here and will make photos available on Flickr.  

For all information about the press arrangements for IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, 9-13 June 2025 please see here.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors will convene its regular June meeting at the Agency’s headquarters at 10:00 CEST on Monday, 9 June, in Board Room C, Building C, 4th floor, in the Vienna International Centre (VIC). 

Board discussions are expected to include, among others: Annual Report for 2024; strengthening of the Agency’s technical cooperation activities: Technical Cooperation Report for 2024; Report of the Programme and Budget Committee; verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015); staff of the Department of Safeguards to be used as Agency inspectors; Safeguards Implementation Report for 2024; application of safeguards in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic; NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran; nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine; transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT; designation of members to serve on the Board in 2025–2026; provisional agenda for the 69th regular session of the General Conference; restoration of the sovereign equality of Member States in the IAEA; and representation of other organizations at the 69th regular session of the General Conference.

The Board of Governors meeting is closed to the press. 

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi will open the meeting with an introductory statement, which will be released to journalists after delivery and posted on the IAEA website.  

Press Conference 

Director General Grossi is expected to hold a press conference at 12:30 CEST on Monday, 9 June, in the Press Room of the M building. 

A live video stream of the press conference will be available. The IAEA will provide video footage of the press conference and the Director General’s opening statement here and will make photos available on Flickr.  

Photo Opportunity 

There will be a photo opportunity with the IAEA Director General and the Chair of the Board, Ambassador Matilda Aku Alomatu Osei-Agyeman of Ghana, before the start of the Board meeting, on 9 June at 10:00 CEST in Board Room C, in the C building in the VIC. 

Press Working Area 

The Press Room of the M building’s ground floor will be available as a press working area, starting from 09:00 CEST on 9 June.

Accreditation

All journalists interested in covering the meeting in person – including those with permanent accreditation – are requested to inform the IAEA Press Office of their plans. Journalists without permanent accreditation must send copies of their passport and press ID to the IAEA Press Office by 14:00 CEST on Friday, 6 June. 

We encourage those journalists who do not yet have permanent accreditation to request it at UNIS Vienna. 

Please plan your arrival to allow sufficient time to pass through the VIC security check. 

The time for the press conference was updated from an earlier version. 

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will host the International Conference on Stakeholder Engagement for Nuclear Power Programmes next week, providing a global platform to exchange good practices, experiences, challenges and lessons learned related to stakeholder engagement for nuclear power programmes.

The conference, which is open to media, will take place from 26 to 30 May at the IAEA in the M-Building of the Vienna International Centre (VIC). The conference will also be livestreamed.

A dialogue between IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi and Robert Stone, director of the documentary Pandora’s Promise, will open the conference on Monday, 26 May, at 10:00. Isabelle Boemeke, nuclear energy influencer, will moderate the session.

Over 500 participants from about 80 countries and 13 international organizations are registered to participate in the event. 

Stakeholder engagement is an essential part of nuclear power programmes. It aims to enhance public confidence, strengthen communication and support informed decision making through strong, long-term relationships with stakeholders. The conference will cover development and implementation of stakeholder engagement strategies; managing changing landscapes; crisis communication and emergency preparedness; outreach and media relations. A series of side events will highlight the roles of private philanthropy, gender perceptions and art in shaping stakeholder engagement. See the full programme here.

Nuclear Communities and Mayors in Focus, a unique platform for open dialogue and the exchange of ideas among municipal leaders from around the world, will take place in the afternoon of Tuesday, 27 May. A family photo will be taken at 13:30.

The conference will also feature art submitted for the contest, NuclearPop! Redefining Nuclear Energy in Popular Culture, in the Rotunda of the VIC.

Accreditation

All journalists – including those with permanent accreditation to the Vienna International Centre (VIC) – are requested to inform the IAEA Press Office of their plans to attend the conference in person. Journalists without permanent accreditation to the VIC must send copies of their passport and press ID to press@iaea.org by 12:00 CEST on Friday, 23 May.

Journalists who do not yet have permanent accreditation are encouraged to request it at UNIS Vienna.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The Eighth Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (the Joint Convention) will be held at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the M-Building of the Vienna International Centre (VIC) from 17 to 28 March. 

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi will address the opening plenary session on 17 March at 09:00 CET. Jean-Luc Lachaume, Commissioner of the French Authority for Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, will preside over the Eighth Review Meeting and will open the proceedings.   

In force since 2001, the Joint Convention seeks to achieve and maintain a high level of worldwide safety in spent fuel and radioactive waste management. Currently, of the 180 IAEA Member States, 90 are party to the Convention. At Review Meetings held every three years, the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention present and discuss national reports on the implementation of obligations under the Convention. 

The agenda for the two-week meeting also includes a topical session on knowledge management related to long term management of disused sealed radioactive sources, radioactive waste and spent fuel, and a discussion of Contracting Parties’ proposals for enhancing the review process. 

Press Opportunities 

Journalists are invited to attend: 

• and the part of the closing session where the Contracting Parties will adopt a Summary Report – currently foreseen to be held in the afternoon of 28 March. For the exact timing of the closing session, please contact press@iaea.org. 

Both sessions will be streamed live and will take place in Boardroom B/M1 in M Building of the VIC. Photos will also be made available at the IAEA Flickr page. 

Accreditation 

All journalists interested in covering the meeting in person – including those with permanent accreditation – are requested to inform the IAEA Press Office of their plans. Journalists without permanent accreditation must send copies of their passport and press ID to the IAEA Press Office.  

We encourage those journalists who do not yet have permanent accreditation to request it at UNIS Vienna.  

Please plan your arrival to allow sufficient time to pass through the VIC security check.  

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –