Category: IAEA

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The IAEA team at Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) reported hearing hundreds of rounds of small arms fire last night, the latest sign of military activity potentially threatening nuclear safety and security, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

The large number of shots – repeatedly fired for about an hour from 10pm local time – was unusual, the team members reported.  

Conducting a site walkdown this morning, they saw numerous small calibre casings lying scattered on the ground near reactor units 5 and 6. There was no sign of broken windows or other physical damage.

The IAEA team at the ZNPP is seeking further information about the incident.

“Such military activity at or near a major nuclear power plant is clearly unacceptable,” Director General Grossi said.  

Saturday evening’s shooting came after a series of purported attacks and other incidents involving drones near the ZNPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine in recent months, including a report of a strike a few days ago in the city of Enerhodar, where most ZNPP staff live.  

Director General Grossi reiterated his deep concern about the apparent increased use of drones near nuclear power plants since early this year, saying such weaponry posed a clear risk to nuclear safety and security.

Any drone strike on a nuclear facility would violate the Seven Indispensable Pillars for nuclear safety and security during an armed conflict as well as the Five Principles to help ensure nuclear safety and security at the ZNPP, outlined by the Director General in March 2022 and May 2023, respectively.  

“We are seeing a clear escalation in drone strikes during this war, also affecting Ukraine’s nuclear power plants and potentially putting them in further danger. As I have repeatedly stated, any military attack on a nuclear site – with or without drones – jeopardizes nuclear safety and must stop immediately,” Director General Grossi said.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been informed about a purported drone attack on the city hall in Enerhodar, where most staff of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) live, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said.

During a visit to Enerhodar today, the IAEA team members based at the ZNPP were taken to the city hall and could see some damage at the top of the building, which they were told was caused by a drone strike at around 1am on Friday morning. There were no reports of casualties. Enerhodar is located about 5 km from the ZNPP.

If confirmed, it would be the latest in a series of drone incidents near the ZNPP and other nuclear facilities in Ukraine, further endangering nuclear safety during the conflict.

“As drone attacks have become increasingly common during the war, so have the risks they pose to the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. I’m deeply concerned about the increased frequency of such incidents. In the case of Enerhodar, they also add to the psychological stress for plant staff, which can also impact nuclear safety and security,” Director General Grossi said.  

Less than two weeks ago, the IAEA team at the ZNPP was informed of a drone attack that reportedly damaged several vehicles near the site’s cooling pond.

In February, a drone severely damaged the New Safe Confinement (NSC) at the Chornobyl plant in northern Ukraine, built to prevent any radioactive release from the reactor unit 4 destroyed in the 1986 accident and to protect it from external hazards.

Ukraine’s operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – also regularly report of drones being detected near the respective sites.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team of experts today said China had made significant progress in further strengthening its regulation of nuclear safety, benefiting from the innovative use of digital tools and Artificial Intelligence (AI) as the country continues to rapidly expand its nuclear energy programme.

Noting the importance of the regulatory body’s staffing levels keeping up with China’s fast-growing nuclear industry, the peer review team also encouraged additional improvements in regulations and guidelines in some areas, including nuclear safety inspections and emergency preparedness and response.

The Integrated Regulatory Review Service  (IRRS) team concluded a 12-day mission to the People’s Republic of China on 11 July, a full-scope review covering all facilities, activities and exposure situations. The 24-member expert mission was conducted at the request of the Government and hosted by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment (the National Nuclear Safety Administration), which regulates nuclear safety in China.

With the world’s second largest operating nuclear fleet after the United States, China is currently operating 59 units generating around 5% of its electricity. In addition, it is building 32 units and planning the construction of another 21 units. The previous IRRS mission to China – a follow-up review – was carried out in 2016, when it had 32 units in operation.

“Over the past decade, China has made impressive headway in establishing a capable and independent regulatory body and promoting a healthy nuclear safety culture. China has a strong, competent and trusted national regulator that works effectively to ensure the safety of the public and environment,” said IRRS team leader Mark Foy, former Chief Executive and Chief Nuclear Inspector of the United Kingdom’s Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR).

Using IAEA safety standards and taking advantage of international good practices, IRRS missions are designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the national regulatory infrastructure, while recognizing the responsibility of each country to ensure nuclear and radiation safety.

The IRRS team comprised 20 senior regulatory experts from 17 IAEA Member States: Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The mission team also included four IAEA staff members and an observer from Japan.

The team reviewed areas including: responsibilities and functions of the government and the regulatory body; the activities of the regulatory body including authorization, inspection and enforcement processes; development and content of regulations and guides; emergency preparedness and response; radiation sources; research reactors; nuclear power plants; fuel cycle facilities; radioactive waste management facilities; transport of radioactive material; decommissioning; occupational exposure; control of medical exposure and public exposure; and interfaces with nuclear security. 

Two policy issues were discussed during the mission: the impact of the rapid development of AI on regulation and the shortage of human resources due to the surge in the number of operating reactor units in China.

“The fast growth in China’s nuclear power programme will require the recruitment and training of a significant number of additional nuclear professionals in the regulatory field in the coming years. Its use of technology to support the effectiveness of its national regulator is an exemplar for all of us to learn from,” Foy, the mission team leader, said.

During the mission, the team conducted interviews and discussions with staff of the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) and its leadership. Team members also met senior representatives from the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), which oversees the nuclear industry in the country, as well as the National Health Commission (NHC) and the China National Energy Authority (NEA).

They observed regulatory oversight activities at: a nuclear power plant, a research reactor, a nuclear fuel cycle facility, a radiation sources facility, a radioactive waste management facility, a transport facility and a hospital.

They identified several good practices by the regulatory body, including:

• Unique advances in developing, adopting and exploiting the benefits of AI-based tools to significantly improve the efficiency of its decision-making, safety oversight and knowledge management.
• Arrangements for regular, high-level exchanges with all senior industry stakeholders on domestic and global nuclear safety developments, ensuring a common understanding on nuclear safety priorities and required improvements across China’s nuclear industry.

Recommendations and suggestions for further improvement of the overall effectiveness of China’s regulatory system included:

• Clarifying protection strategies in the case of a nuclear or radiological emergency.
• Providing a documented process for developing inspection plans for nuclear facilities.
• Establishing and implementing a comprehensive safety culture oversight programme.

• Enhancing its processes to ensure that updates to department rules, guides, and standards are completed to appropriately align with the latest IAEA safety standards.

The mission team viewed China’s invitation of an international peer review as part of the second IRRS cycle as a sign of openness and transparency.

“China has demonstrated a commendable commitment to continuous safety improvement by inviting this comprehensive full-scope IRRS mission,” said Karine Herviou, Deputy Director General and Head of the IAEA Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. “The team of senior regulatory experts recognized the Government’s unequivocal support to ensure a strong national safety regulator, including the provision of human and financial resources, while also proposing specific actions for further enhancements.”

Baotong Dong, MEE Vice Minister and NNSA Administrator, said the IRRS peer review team had positively acknowledged China’s nuclear and radiation safety regulatory framework and practices and stressed that these would be further enhanced in future.

“China has established a regulatory system that aligns with international standards while meeting national conditions. The Government will further enhance its regulatory capabilities, accelerate the development of a modern nuclear safety regulatory system, and promote a virtuous cycle of high-level nuclear safety and high-quality development in the nuclear sector,” Vice Minister Dong said. “China stands ready to contribute to strengthening global nuclear safety governance and elevating worldwide nuclear safety standards.”

The final mission report will be provided to the Government of the China in about three months. The Government plans to make the report public. China will consider inviting an IRRS follow-up mission at a later stage.

IAEA safety standards

The IAEA safety standards provide a robust framework of fundamental principles, requirements and guidance to ensure safety. They reflect an international consensus and serve as a global reference for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) remains connected to its last remaining main power line following the recent loss of all off-site power on 4 July, an ongoing situation that highlights the heightened nuclear safety and security risks during the conflict, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said today.

The loss of power– the ninth since the start of the conflict in February 2022 – forced the ZNPP to rely on its backup diesel generators for almost four hours as the plant’s one remaining back-up line remains disconnected after being reportedly damaged by military activity on 7 May. The IAEA team based at the ZNPP site— Europe’s largest nuclear facility — was informed this week that the emergency diesel generator fuel tanks used during the loss of power have since been replenished and the site has enough fuel to enable operation of emergency diesel generators for approximately 20 days, in case of a loss of off-site power event.

The IAEA team at South Ukraine nuclear power plant (SUNPP) reported that the plant also lost its connection to one 750 kilovolt (kV) off-site power line on 4 July, for approximately the same time as the ZNPP lost off-site power. During that time, the SUNPP continued to receive off-site power from its other 750 kV line and all of its 330 kV power lines. There was no impact on the one unit currently operating, while the other two units continue planned maintenance and refueling activities.

The IAEA team continued to assess the availability of spare parts necessary for the continued safe operation of the plant by visiting the storage areas for the parts in the thermomechanical and electrical warehouses located within the ZNPP’s site perimeter and will be requesting the findings of recent audits by the ZNPP of spare parts. The team is also expecting to be updated on the delayed procurement of spare parts needed so that the ZNPP can commence annual maintenance of all 20 emergency diesel generators which are essential to safety in case of a loss of off-site power event.

Also this week, the IAEA team reported that maintenance activities continue at the site, including on one safety train of unit 2 and on the main transformer of unit 4, while maintenance on one safety train of unit 5 is expected to be completed on Friday. Recently, the team also visited all main control rooms where it confirmed the number of operating staff present and recorded safety parameters for all units.

The IAEA team reported hearing military activity on most days over the past week, including gunfire near the plant on 4 July and three explosions close to the plant on 5 July.

The IAEA team at the Rivne nuclear power plant (NPP) reported that one reactor continues its planned maintenance and refueling activities, and one other unit was required to temporarily reduce reactor power to enable for the inspection and repair of one of the turbines. The repairs were successfully completed, and the reactor has returned to nominal full power.

IAEA teams present at all sites — the Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine NPPs and the Chornobyl NPP site — reported hearing air raid alarms on most days over the past week. At the Khmelnytskyy NPP the team was informed that drones were observed as close as five kilometres from the site, while the team at the Rivne NPP had to shelter at its hotel on two separate days and the teams at the Khmelnytskyy and Rivne NPPs sheltered at site today. The team at the Chornobyl NPP site reported hearing the sounds of a drone and anti-aircraft fire at the Chornobyl NPP site on the evening of 9 July, and were informed by the site management that a drone had reportedly flown over the open switchyard and was intercepted by the military. 

As part of the IAEA’s comprehensive assistance programme to support nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, the Chornobyl NPP site received equipment aimed at enhancing the nuclear security measures at the site and the Khmelnytskyy and South Ukraine NPPs received equipment aimed at enhancing radiation monitoring capabilities. Additionally, the Ukrainian Hydrometeorological Center and the hydrometeorological organizations of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine received multipurpose radiation monitoring devices.

These deliveries were funded by the European Union, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, and brought the total number of IAEA-coordinated deliveries since the start of the armed conflict to 146.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

TIC2026 will bring together nuclear safety regulators, plant designers and operators, technical support organizations, and other stakeholders from various countries, along with international organizations. The goal is to build on insights on key topics related to nuclear installation design safety, safety assessment, siting, construction, operation and regulation for both operating and new nuclear installations.

“The conference will provide a comprehensive forum for nuclear safety stakeholders from various generations of nuclear projects, and a wide range of nuclear safety fields, to address different issues in nuclear installation safety, making it an inclusive event,” said Ana Gomez, Head of the IAEA Safety Assessment Section.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

“This discovery is a true milestone. After more than 35 years of research, we now have a precise molecular handle on temperature-sensitive lethality,” said Kostas Bourtzis, a molecular biologist in the Joint Centre’s Insect Pest Control Section and co-author of the study. “This opens up the possibility of expanding genetic sexing systems to a wide range of insect pests with agricultural, veterinary and medical relevance — a major advancement for SIT programmes globally.”

“With the identification of the tsl gene, we are closing a major knowledge gap that has long hindered the application of genetic sexing beyond the Mediterranean fruit fly,” said Marc F. Schetelig, professor of insect biotechnology in plant protection at JLU and liaison officer at the newly established Liebig Centre for Agroecology and Climate Impact Research, also a co-author of the study. “This paves the way for highly specific and sustainable insect control strategies without the use of chemical insecticides.”

The study exemplifies the longstanding close strategic partnership between JLU and the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre. With recent designation of the Liebig Centre for Agroecology and Climate Impact Research as an IAEA Collaborating Centre in May 2025, this collaboration has been institutionalized, enabling the joint development of biotechnology tools for sustainable insect pest control on a global scale.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Interested contributors have until 15 September 2025 to submit synopses for the IAEA’s International Conference on the Safe and Secure Transport of Nuclear and Radioactive Material.

The IAEA estimates that 20 million shipments of radioactive material are transported every year. These materials are shipped nationally and internationally by road, rail, sea, air and inland waterways for applications such as medicine and health, agriculture, nuclear power generation and advanced scientific research. 

The conference, to be hosted in Vienna, Austria from 23 to 27 March 2026, will cover the legislative and regulatory framework for the transport of nuclear and other radioactive material, safety and security by design; safety and security during transport operations. It builds on previous events held in 2011 and 2021.

“For decades, IAEA safety standards have been the backbone for the safe transport of radioactive material. With rapid technological advances in the nuclear and transport sectors, the global landscape is evolving — and fast. This conference aims to drive innovation, share experience and help strengthen the global standards,” said Shazia Fayyaz, one of the scientific secretaries and Head of the IAEA Transport Safety Unit in the Division of Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety.

“During transport, nuclear and radioactive material may be vulnerable to a number of modal specific risks and threats,” said Robert Officer, the other scientific secretary of the conference and Head of the IAEA Transport Security Unit in the Division of Nuclear Security. “The conference will further raise awareness through sharing experiences on strengthening safety and security capabilities, including on such topics as legal and policy frameworks, and technological and commercial trends for the protection of end-to-end transport.”

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) lost all off-site power for several hours today, once again underlining the extremely fragile nuclear safety situation at the site, IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi said today.

The plant’s connection to its last remaining 750 kilovolt (kV) power line was cut at 17:37 local time today and restored around 21:11, forcing it to rely on emergency diesel generators for more than three and a half hours. While the cause was not immediately known, it coincided with air raid alarms in the region, Director General Grossi said, citing information from the Ukrainian nuclear regulator.

It was the ninth time the ZNPP suffered a complete loss of off-site power since the conflict began in February 2022, and the first since 2 December 2023.

The IAEA team based at the site, Europe’s largest nuclear power plant (NPP), reported that 18 emergency diesel generators immediately started operating to generate the electricity the plant needs to be able to cool the reactors and the spent fuel pools. The plant has diesel fuel for at least 10 days on-site, and arrangements in place to secure further supplies. Once off-site power was restored, the diesel generators were switched off.

“What was once virtually unimaginable – that a major nuclear power plant would repeatedly lose all of its external power connections – has unfortunately become a common occurrence at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant. Almost three and a half years into this devastating war, nuclear safety in Ukraine remains very much in danger,” Director General Grossi said.

“Our team on the ground will continue to follow the situation very closely and report on further developments there,” he said.

The ZNPP’s six reactors have been in cold shutdown since 2024 but still require cooling water for their reactor cores and spent fuel pools. The ZNPP lost the connection to its last remaining 330 kV back-up power line on 7 May, leaving the plant dependent on its sole 750 kV line. Before the conflict, it had ten off-site power lines available, highlighting the extent to which nuclear safety has deteriorated since February 2022.

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

IAEA Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi’s keynote address at the Nobel Peace Prize Forum 2024.

I want to start by congratulating Nihon Hidankyō and the hibakusha for their Nobel Peace Prize.

As a young diplomat almost 40 years ago, I was fortunate to be part of a UN disarmament fellowship programme and to visit Hiroshima. There, fellows had an opportunity to meet the hibakusha and I had a conversation with an ailing victim. I have carried to every meeting, to every negotiation, and to every posting, the memory this woman’s silent testimony. When I asked her about that morning in 1945, she struggled to express the horror in words. She tried to articulate some words but stayed silent. Looking at me, right into my eyes. The look in her eyes has stayed with me ever since, like a powerful reminder, a secret mandate, to work so that her suffering is never repeated.

For decades after the Second World War, the international community has been dealing with this unique dilemma: we built robust norms and passed nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. Instead of dozens of countries armed with nuclear weapons, as was the concern in the 1960s, there are less than ten. Stockpiles of nuclear weapons have shrunk from tens of thousands to thousands.

But on its journey through the perils of the atomic age, the world has come to a crucial crossroads. Our deep psychological connection caused by collectively seeing the horror of the consequences of nuclear war seems to be evaporating, taking with it our joint resolve to do everything possible to prevent a repetition.

Like a giant spotlight, this year’s Nobel Peace Prize has lit up our path ahead. It has done it, by reminding us of the past, and of the consequences of ignoring the perils of nuclear weapons use.

Context of conflicts

To understand the important challenges we face, we must look at the global context, at what is happening around the world.  

War has returned to Europe, and it directly involves a nuclear weapon state. The conflict in Ukraine is also an indirect confrontation between the world’s biggest nuclear weapon states, the first since the end of the Cold War. But nuclear exercises and open references to the use of nuclear weapons in the theatre of this war are increasing the risks and can not be ignored.

In the Middle East, the conflict of the past year has ignited smoldering tensions between Israel and Iran and led to the unprecedented step of direct exchanges and attacks between the two. Here there is also a nuclear weapons dimension. On one side, the assumed presence of nuclear weapons looms in the background. On the other, the very real potential of nuclear proliferation is raising the stakes.

We find ourselves in a harmful loop: the erosion of the restraints around nuclear weapons is making these conflicts more dangerous. Meanwhile, these conflicts are contributing to the erosion of the restraints. The vicious circle dynamic is in motion.

An unfortunate change of direction

Doctrines regarding the use of nuclear weapons are being revised or reinterpreted. The quantity and quality of nuclear weapon stockpiles are being increased. 

And in some non-nuclear weapon states – states that are important in their region – leaders are asking “why not us?”. And they are asking this openly!

At the start of the nuclear arms race, J Robert Oppenheimer described the USSR and the US as “two scorpions in a bottle” each capable of killing the other, but only by risking their own life.

Oppenheimer’s blunt statement would later be developed and elaborated under the roof of deterrence and the more sophisticated concept of “Mutual Assured Destruction,” or MAD.

Today, independent of the vantage point of the observer, there is widespread concern that the risk of mutual destruction through nuclear war is higher than it has been for more than a generation.

Lessons from history

But it does not have to be this way. We can do better. History has shown that effective dialogue among superpowers has, more often than not, led to confidence and, as a result, also to arms limitation and even disarmament. At certain moments in history, world leaders took the right decisions, to tone down, or, to use today’s parlance, to de-escalate. Let’s see:

The end of the Cuban Missile Crisis happened thanks to the direct engagement of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and US President John F Kennedy. Decades later, at the Geneva Summit of 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev and President Ronald Reagan agreed a crucial axiom: “Nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.” They met again the next year in Reykjavik and significant reductions in nuclear arsenals followed. Nuclear weapon reductions and the elimination of a whole category of weapon, through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, or INF, Treaty, were agreed. These steps towards rapprochement took leadership and courage. They often happened despite skepticism and voices against them.

Diplomacy and dialogue (and the duty of nuclear weapon states)

A return to diplomacy and dialogue is urgently needed, and this, not only in things nuclear. Shutting the other side out has never solved a problem and almost certainly aggravates it. Top leadership involvement is simply indispensable when nuclear weapons are involved. President Trump took the initiative and talked to Kim Jong Un. More of this is needed. Some have said these talks were ill prepared. I say, this is important. Nuclear weapon policy and limitations does not work bottom up. It is of course the other way around.

We must be proactive in building the trust and protections that lower the risk of close calls and of brinkmanship, especially during today’s tensions. Not taking active steps means we rely on luck – or the assumption that the other side will show restraint – to save us from nuclear war. The longer you rely on luck, the more likely it is to run out.

Conflict and tensions compel nations to arm themselves. Diplomacy and compromise create conditions in which they can disarm.

The road to a nuclear weapon-free world is long and winding. The disarmament landscape is complex, and it’s worth acknowledging that. This does not diminish the responsibility nuclear weapons states have to make progress. After all, they committed themselves to this goal back in 1968, through the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Steps can be taken to decrease the reliance on nuclear weapons, both in their production and the scenarios for their use.

Nuclear weapon states, through their actions at home and on the world stage, have a responsibility to avoid a scenario in which more countries seek nuclear weapons. Pushing ahead with increases in arsenals leads to despair, cynicism, and a growing skepticism about the value of past commitments. Disengagement and unilateralism fuel sentiments of vulnerability in other countries, and with that, the notion nuclear weapons could be the ultimate protection against outside threats.

Engagement among the five permanent members of the Security Council is indispensable. Such engagement can take many different shapes, starting with direct contact among themselves, bilaterally or as a group. This dialogue, which still exists, has been reduced to a very low level, virtually without real impact. Perhaps its revival could be assisted by an international organization, or facilitated with the support of a respected, impartial leader. Therefore, it’s essential that the United Nations, other international organizations, and their leaders work effectively to ensure their continued relevance amid the changing needs of their stakeholders.

Do not make things worse (by falling for the siren call of proliferation)

The IAEA has played its indispensable technical role during past attempts of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the Middle East. As the difficult experiences in Iraq, Libya and Syria remind us, the draw of nuclear weapons is real and so is the geopolitical and military response.

Today’s tensions are prompting even leaders of important counties that, so far, are in good standing with the NPT to ask: “Why shouldn’t we have a nuclear weapon too?”

To this, I would say, “Do not make things worse.” Acquiring a nuclear weapon will not increase national security, it will do the opposite. Other countries will follow. And this will contribute to the unravelling of a nonproliferation regime that has had its ups and downs – and it still has its limitations – but none-the-less it has served humanity extraordinarily well. The problem and challenge to the NPT regime may come from those nuclear armed but also those who, while not having nuclear weapons, may feel the NPT has failed as a catalyst to disarmament.

Weakening the non-proliferation treaty under the argument that progress on nuclear disarmament has been slow and more drastic approaches are required, would be totally misguided and may make us throw away existing international measures committing nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states in this field.

I come from a non-nuclear weapon state. I understand the frustration that some people feel about the “haves” and “have-nots” of nuclear weapons. But I have also seen the legacy of peace and prosperity left by leaders who resisted that siren call. In the 1980s, vision, resolve and dialogue meant Brazil and Argentina changed course and did not go down the path to nuclear arms. Today, Latin America is a nuclear weapon free zone.

Multilateral leaders: step up by stepping in

Many wonder whether there’s still a role for multilateralism in guiding us through this maze of conflicting interests. Yes, there is. During difficult times in the past, international organizations have had a big impact on peace and security. But it only happens when leaders of these organizations get off the side lines and use their mandate and their own good offices effectively.

We prove our relevance in extraordinary times.   

Each organization has different tools, a different mandate, a different membership, and each of their leaders will determine how to act. I can speak for the IAEA.  We have nuclear science at our core, and we are the world’s nuclear weapons watchdog. Let me give you an example:

For almost three years, Ukraine, the world and the IAEA have been confronted with a completely unprecedented situation – never before has a military conflict involved the seizure of a nuclear power plant and been fought among the facilities of a major nuclear power programme.

At the beginning of the war, Ukraine’s biggest nuclear power plant – the biggest nuclear power plant in Europe, with nearly 6 gigawatts of installed capacity – was taken by Russia. This established a hotspot in the middle of a combat zone. The chance of an incident – or accident – causing terrible radiological consequences became real.

Observing this from the outside was never, in my mind, an option. Staying on the sidelines and later reflecting on “lessons learned” may have been the more traditional – or expected – path for an international organization. But to me this would have been a dereliction of duty. So, we leaned into our core mission, crossed the front lines of war, and established a permanent presence of IAEA experts at all Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. That makes us the only international organization operating independently in occupied territory. We are informing the world of what’s going on and reducing the chance that a radiological incident enflames the conflict and causes even more devastation.

We did the same by going to Kursk when a Russian nuclear reactor was at risk of coming into the line of fire. I am in constant communication with both sides.

I have been meeting with President Zelenskyy, and President Putin regularly. Nuclear safety and security during this conflict must have the buy-in and continued involvement of both leaders. Talking to only one of them would not achieve this important goal. At the same time, I am keeping an open dialogue with leaders on all continents and briefing the UN Security Council. When it comes to nuclear safety in Ukraine it has been possible to build a level of agreement that is rare during the divisions of this conflict. Where there is agreement, there is hope for more agreement.

Ukraine is not our only hotspot.

In Iran, the IAEA’s job is to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of a growing nuclear programme. Iran has now enriched uranium to a level that is hard to justify. It has not yet answered the IAEA’s questions completely and it has made our work more difficult by taking away some of our cameras and blocking some of our most experienced safeguards inspectors from going into the country. This has caused concern and led to a pattern of mistrust and recriminations. In diplomacy, progress often requires prompting, catalyzing, and suggesting ways forward. This presents a role for an impartial, honest and effective broker. It is a role I, in my capacity as the IAEA’s Director General, have been playing. In fact, I returned from my latest visit to Tehran just a few weeks ago where I presented alternatives and ideas to reduce the growing tensions, and hopefully to retain Iran within the NPT and the non-proliferation norms.

The danger of playing it safe

When it comes to working on behalf of peace and security, playing it safe is dangerous.

Silence and indifference can be deadly.

Dag Hammerskjold, the second Secretary General of the United Nations, said: “It is when we all play safe that we create a world of utmost insecurity.”

A new path

This week, the Norwegian Nobel Committee looked beyond today’s conflicts. In its own way, it did not play it safe. Instead, it shined a light on the horrors of nuclear war and the people who have been warning us about them for many decades.

In doing that, the Nobel Committee, Nihon Hidankyō and the hibakusha have illuminated the danger of the path we are now on.

We have to make a new path.

First, the leaders of the nuclear weapon states must recognize the need for a responsible management of their nuclear arsenals. Experiences from the past confirm that even at times of crisis and conflict it has been possible to recognize the unique terminal power of these weapons and the responsibility that comes with it. What Kennedy, Khrushchev, Reagan, Gorbachev, or Trump did by reaching out to a nuclear-armed adversary, sets a precedent, a useful one. Such contacts, either bilateral or at the P5 level could possibly be facilitated by a competent broker. These are the first steps to bringing down the tone so that nuclear sabre rattling recedes and the commitments to the unequivocal undertakings to move towards a nuclear free world can be fulfilled.

Secondly, an iron-clad resolve to observe and strengthen the global non-proliferation regime needs to be adopted. Nuclear weapon and nuclear non-weapon states must work together to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Ladies and gentlemen,

We need to walk through perilous times by recognizing limitations and keeping our eyes on our common objectives.

Nuclear disarmament cannot be imposed on the nuclear armed.

Realism is not defeatism. Diplomacy is not weakness.

Difficult times call for enlightened leadership, at the national level, and at the international level as well.

Putting the international system back on track is within our reach. World leaders, including those at the top of the multilateral system, have a duty and an irrevocable responsibility to work towards this.  

Personally, I am convinced. Perhaps, because the secret mandate I received that day in Hiroshima from a hibakusha burns in me, stronger than ever. Thank you.